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THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF DELAWARE’S 
NASCENT PRISTINE DEAL PROCESS 
STANDARD 
ALEX PEÑA* & BRIAN JM QUINN** 
In a merger, shareholders who believe the consideration being offered is 
too low have a statutory right to seek fair value for their shares through a 
judicial process called appraisal.  In recent years, there has been an explosion 
in the number of appraisal actions leading some to argue that the remedy was 
being abused.  In this Article, we argue that a recent line of cases by the 
Delaware Supreme Court that places heavy reliance on merger price as part of 
the judicial determination of fair value in appraisal proceedings is misguided 
and may lead to unintended consequences.  Rather than rely on merger price 
in the determinations of fair value for publicly traded companies, courts should 
either eliminate the appraisal remedy for publicly traded corporations 
altogether or look to the unaffected stock market price of merger targets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a merger, shareholders who believe the consideration being offered is too 
low have a statutory right to seek fair value for their shares through a judicial 
process called appraisal.  In recent years, there has been an explosion in the 
number of appraisal actions leading some to argue that the remedy was being 
abused.  In this Article, we argue that a recent line of cases by the Delaware 
Supreme Court that places heavy reliance on merger price as part of the judicial 
determination of fair value in appraisal proceedings is misguided and may lead 
to unintended consequences.  Rather than rely on merger price in the 
determinations of fair value for publicly traded companies, courts should either 
look to the unaffected stock market price of merger targets or eliminate the 
appraisal remedy for publicly traded corporations altogether. 
Until recently, appraisal litigation had largely been a backwater of corporate 
practice and jurisprudence with most shareholders opting to accept merger 
consideration rather than expend resources and time to pursue appraisal 
petitions.  However, by the 2010’s, this changed.  In a series of papers, 
Professors Korsmo and Myers identified a significant increase in appraisal 
litigation, observing that the value of appraisal claims rose tenfold between 
2004 and 2013.1  They attribute much of this growth to the participation of 
financial arbitrageurs in appraisal litigation.  The increased attention from 
financial arbitrageurs in what was previously a litigation afterthought gave rise 
to critiques that “appraisal arbs” and professional investors were abusing a legal 
remedy that was not meant for them.2 
 
1. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the 
Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 829 (2014) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Merits]; Charles R. 
Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage]; Charles R. Korsmo & 
Minor Myers, Interest in Appraisal, 42 J. CORP. L. 109, 111 (2016) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, 
Interest]; Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 279, 282 (2017) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Reforming]. 
2. Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting 
Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 604 (2018) [hereinafter Shifting Tides]; see, e.g., 
Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE 
SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/delaware-legislature-
should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/SGW5-WTTP]. 
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This rapid increase in appraisal litigation did not arise in a vacuum.  Rather, 
appraisal arbitrage is one of but a number of strategies that litigants have used 
over the past two decades to extract rent from transactions.  By the 2010s, 96% 
of publicly announced mergers were the subject of litigation.3  Clearly, it was 
not the case that directors uniformly violated standards of conduct and law such 
that they were worthy targets of litigation.  Rather, the prevalence of litigation 
in connection with announced merger transactions is more likely a function of 
rent-seeking behavior by litigants.4 
In response, courts in Delaware adopted a series of doctrinal innovations to 
stem the tide of this trend.  These doctrinal innovations took form over a series 
of decisions, including In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,5 Kahn v. M & 
F Worldwide Corp.,6 and Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,7 that had 
the cumulative effect of deterring low-quality, transaction-related fiduciary 
litigation by reducing the economic value of settlement for such claims.  With 
respect to appraisal litigation, courts moved to address a perception that 
professional investors were abusing the appraisal remedy.  Through a series of 
cases at Chancery (In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc.8) and in the Delaware 
Supreme Court (Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP,9 DFC Global 
Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners,10 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global 
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd11), courts began to minimize the economic 
 
3. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 484–86 (2015) [hereinafter Great Game]; Matthew 
D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, 3 (Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Takeover Litigation 2015], 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/7JDN-ZGE5]; Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. 
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 133, 135 (2004); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012, 1–2 (Feb. 
1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Takeover Litigation 2012], 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216727 [https://perma.cc/23LV-EK78] (finding that almost 92% of all 
transactions with a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012). 
4. The problem of rent-seeking behavior in the context of shareholder litigation is well-known.  
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder 
Litigation, L. CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 9. 
5. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
6. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
7. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
8. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015). 
9. 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010). 
10. 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
11. 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017). 
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incentives to bring appraisal actions by leaning more heavily on the role of 
merger price in the judicial determination of fair value where there is a pristine 
deal process.12 
The court justified its reliance on merger price in fair value determinations 
by pointing to the efficiency of markets and the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (ECMH), rationalizing that if a merger has been exposed to the 
forces of the market and no second bidder has offered a topping bid, such a 
price must be fair for purposes of an appraisal.13  The court’s reliance on the 
ECMH in the context of appraisal valuation has generated a good deal of 
academic discussion.14  This paper adds to that discussion in the following 
ways.  First, merger price as an indicator of fair value is contrary to appraisal’s 
statutory mandate that fair value not include any element of value arising from 
the merger.  Second, to the extent merger price becomes the default starting 
point for fair value determinations, the court’s reliance on pristine deal process 
will transform an appraisal proceeding into something akin to fiduciary duty 
litigation (something we call “quasi-fiduciary litigation”), thus opening up a 
new, wholly-unexpected avenue for litigants.  Finally, we observe that the 
court’s explicit reliance on the ECMH is at odds with many of the policy-related 
justifications for director authority that have undergirded the court’s fiduciary 
litigation over the years. 
If one takes seriously Section 262(h)’s statutory charge that an appraisal 
valuation must exclude “any element[s] of value arising from the . . . merger,” 
then reliance on merger price, particularly in the context of a played-out 
auction, necessarily exceeds the statutory limitations placed on such 
valuations.15  Basic bargaining theory holds that in a bilateral negotiation over 
price, merger price represents a simple division of the buyer’s economic surplus 
 
12. Id. at 21–22.  A judge seeking to determine fair value in a merger must now first look to 
merger price as a primary, though not presumptive, determinant of fair value.  If a judge wishes to 
deviate from merger price, he or she must first justify that decision. 
13. Id. at 24–25. 
14. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 543, 543 (2018); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance 
of Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 259–69 (2018); Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & 
Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal 10–12 (Ind. Legal 
Studies, Research Paper No. 381, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3039040 [https://perma.cc/5DWG-
UHEG]; Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right Question: The Statutory Right of Appraisal 
and Efficient Markets 3, 5 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 428/2018, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279838 [[https://perma.cc/PP3V-DPLH]. 
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). 
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associated with the transaction.  In a fully played out auction, buyers must 
exchange economic surplus associated with the transaction for an increased 
probability of winning the auction.  That is to say, the merger price that results 
from a bilateral negotiation or an auction must, necessarily, include elements of 
value arising from the merger.  Consequently, a court’s reliance on merger price 
for an indication of statutory fair value runs afoul of statutory limitations placed 
on valuation. 
Increasing reliance on merger price by courts simultaneously does both too 
much and too little.  A merger price standard threatens to reduce the statutory 
appraisal remedy for public companies to a nullity or, perhaps worse, transform 
it into a new class of litigation, quasi-fiduciary litigation.16  Although some may 
perceive the increase in use of the appraisal remedy as abuse, it is hard to 
imagine that a legislature would write a remedy into statute and then 
simultaneously not wish for stockholders to access the remedy.  Where 
dissenting shareholders nevertheless pursue appraisal, the effect of the court’s 
new standard is to transform appraisal litigation into quasi-fiduciary litigation.  
This new quasi-fiduciary litigation threatens to create backdoor bright-line rules 
that are otherwise inconsistent with more than three decades of corporate 
takeover jurisprudence.  In order to ensure the court applies merger price, 
boards have an incentive to pursue merger transactions in prescribed manner, 
checking certain boxes along the way to comport with appraisal’s new quasi-
fiduciary requirements.  This may ultimately be a desirable result for corporate 
governance, but it will be unintended and will run contrary to decades of the 
court’s jurisprudence. 
Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent reliance on the ECMH is odd, 
or at least at odds with past precedent.  In the context of fiduciary duty litigation, 
the court has, for the better part of three decades, taken the general position that 
the ECMH did not control and that it was, in fact, sufficiently imperfect as to 
justify protection of board decisions (see e.g., the poison pill cases).17  Where 
 
16. Term quasi-fiduciary litigation is new, but the idea of using appraisal to police fiduciary 
lapses is not.  See Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 875, 879, 901–02 (1983) (suggesting that the appraisal discourages opportunistic behavior by 
parties); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 429, 434 (1985). 
17. Much of this argument played out by proxy in a series of articles in the 1980s by Prof. Ronald 
Gilson, Attorney Martin Lipton, and Prof. Lucien Bebchuk, with the professors taking the position that 
boards should remain neutral in the face of takeover offers, and thus subject the corporation to the 
machinations of the efficient capital market, while Mr. Lipton took the position that markets are not 
efficient and only boards are in the best position to evaluate takeover offers and should thus be 
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for years stockholders have argued that boards must be required to take certain 
actions in response to market prices and signals, courts have uniformly 
demurred.  Rather, courts have given credence to board arguments that boards, 
rather than shareholders or markets, are in the best position to determine what 
actions are in the best interests of the corporation.18  In pursuit of eliminating 
what the court may believe are abusive appraisal claims, recent cases appear to 
throw away much of the court’s previous reticence, permitting markets to 
dictate what is fair value to boards of directors.  By going this route, the court 
may have unintentionally created new avenues of attack for litigants. 
Increasing judicial reliance on merger price as indicator of fair value raises 
the question: What is left of appraisal?  Indeed, not much.  It may be time to 
simply eliminate the appraisal remedy altogether for publicly traded 
corporations.  A statutory fix of this type is not radical and is in accord with 
previous amendments to the appraisal statute over the years.19  Alternatively, 
the courts may, consistent with the present statute, focus determinations of fair 
value on the unaffected stock price of public corporations without regard to 
 
permitted to defend against unwanted offers.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to 
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 891 
(1981); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130–31 (1979) 
[hereinafter Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The 
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1050 (1982).  Other well-
known proponents of the academic view that boards should defer to determinations of the market 
include Judge Easterbrook and Prof. Fischel.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161 
(1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733, 1749–50 
(1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ 
Welfare]. 
18. In Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that 
the Chancery Court’s moves towards board neutrality in the face of a tender offer was a step in the 
wrong direction.  571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) (“In subsequent cases, the Court of Chancery has 
suggested that an all-cash, all-shares offer, falling within a range of values that a shareholder might 
reasonably prefer, cannot constitute a legally recognized ‘threat’ to shareholder interests sufficient to 
withstand a Unocal analysis.”); Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 95–101 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (summarizing the thinking of the academic view and the Delaware Supreme Court’s view 
that it is incorrect). 
19. Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei, & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or 
Litigation Arbitrage? 699–701, 703 (J.L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 16–11, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766776 [https://perma.cc/33ZW-5WW4]; see, e.g., Kanda & Levmore, 
supra note 16, at 432. 
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merger price.  This is not only feasible, but it would be also truer to the purpose 
of the appraisal statute. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner.  Part II surveys the recent 
flood of transaction-related litigation, including appraisal actions and the 
response by the courts seeking to reduce incentives tied to bringing perceived 
rent-seeking litigation.  Part III reviews the appraisal process and its purpose.  
Understanding the purpose of appraisal as a remedy is important as one decides 
the best path to reducing incentives to perceived abuse of the mechanism.  Part 
IV examines the courts use of merger price in determining the statutory fair 
value of dissenting shareholders’ stock as a way of reducing the incentive for 
shareholders to bring, what the courts perceive to be, abusive appraisal claims.  
Part V evaluates a number of challenges that accompany the court’s reliance on 
merger price for fair value determinations.  Part VI proposes changes to the 
appraisal regime to remedy the deficiencies in the current structure and return 
the appraisal remedy to its more modest goals.  Part VII summarizes and 
concludes. 
II. TRANSACTION-RELATED LITIGATION DURING THE 2000S  
Until relatively recently, appraisal, like judicial dissolution or receivership, 
was a little-used remedy, largely vestigial, but available to shareholders in 
extreme circumstances who believed the consideration offered them in a merger 
was unfair.  Professor Eisenberg once observed that appraisal was a remedy of 
“desperation.”20  Another respected legal commentator added to a growing 
chorus, “It is common knowledge that appraisal rights are largely on the way 
out.”21  Indeed, during the 1968 amendments to the Delaware corporate law, 
serious consideration was given to eliminating the appraisal remedy 
altogether.22  It is thus unsurprising that appraisal litigation has largely been a 
backwater of corporate practice and jurisprudence. 
 
20. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969). 
21. Ernest L. Folk, III, Corporation Law Developments—1969, 56 VA. L. REV. 755, 795 (1970). 
22. Henry M. Canby, Delaware’s New Corporation Law, 39 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 380, 387 (1968) 
(“Some members of the committee were inclined to eliminate the appraisal remedy altogether . . . .”); 
Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 829 (1984) 
(“Between 1972 and 1981 there were 16,479 completed mergers involving United States 
concerns. . . .  Yet, during this period only twenty or so reported state court decisions involved an 
appraisal valuation.”). 
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However, in a series of papers from 2014 to 2017, Professors Korsmo and 
Myers identified a significant increase in appraisal litigation brought by 
institutional investors, so called appraisal arbitrageurs.23  They tie the increase 
in the incidence of appraisal actions, in part, to a 2007 decision, In re Appraisal 
of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.,24 in which the court had to reconcile the 
complexities of record versus beneficial ownership of shares.25  At the time, 
Chancellor Chandler anticipated the effect of his decision but felt constrained 
by appraisal’s statutory mandate.26  The effect of Transkaryotic was to 
greenlight arbitrageurs buying stock in announced transactions when the 
pricing of the merger suggested an appraisal action might be a financially viable 
strategy.27  Professors Korsmo and Myers found that between 2004 and 2011, 
approximately 4.5% of merger transactions attracted an appraisal petition.28  
However, from 2011 to 2014, more than 13% of eligible merger transactions 
attracted appraisal petitions.29  Not surprisingly, the rapid increase in appraisal 
litigation generated a good deal of criticism by the Delaware and New York 
 
23. See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1552; Korsmo & Myers, Interest, 
supra note 1, at 111; Korsmo & Myers, Merits, supra note 1, at 829; Korsmo & Myers, Reforming, 
supra note 1, at 314. 
24. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
25. Id. (“The question presented in this case can be stated thusly: Must a beneficial shareholder, 
who purchased shares after the record date but before the merger vote, prove, by documentation, that 
each newly acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted in favor of the merger by the 
previous beneficial shareholder?”). 
26. Chancellor Chandler observed: 
Respondents raise one policy concern that deserves mentioning.  They argue that 
this decision will “pervert the goals of the appraisal statute by allowing it to be 
used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs as opposed to a statutory safety net for 
objecting stockholders.”  That is, the result I reach here may, argue respondents, 
encourage appraisal litigation initiated by arbitrageurs who buy into appraisal 
suits by free-riding on [the petitioner’s] votes on behalf of other beneficial 
holders—a disfavored outcome.  To the extent that this concern has validity, relief 
more properly lies with the Legislature.  Section 262, as currently drafted, dictates 
the conclusion reached here.  Only the record holder possesses and may perfect 
appraisal rights.  The statute simply does not allow consideration of the beneficial 
owner in this context.  The Legislature, not this Court, possesses the power to 
modify [section] 262 to avoid the evil, if it is an evil, that purportedly concerns 
respondents. 
Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted). 
27. Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1553–54. 
28. Korsmo & Myers, Reforming, supra note 1, at 289. 
29. Id. 
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M&A Bar that arbitrageurs were abusing the appraisal remedy.30  In response 
to these criticisms, the Delaware legislature amended the appraisal statute to 
include various provisions in an attempt to reduce incentives for litigants to 
bring appraisal actions.31 
Appraisal arbitrage and the increase in appraisal litigation did not arise in a 
vacuum.  A series of other papers identified a rising flood of transaction-related 
litigation during the past two decades, of which appraisal petitions were only a 
small fraction.32  By 2016, more than 90% of all announced merger transactions 
over $100 million were accompanied by litigation without regard to the 
underlying merits of the proposed merger.33  The rise of this litigation industrial 
complex in the past twenty-five years had much more to do with the economic 
incentives for litigants to bring litigation for its settlement value than it did with 
bringing litigation on behalf of stockholders harmed by self-serving boards.34 
With the onslaught of shareholder litigation came the inevitable backlash.  
In the wake of a flood of federal securities litigation in the 1990s, the backlash 
came in the form of federal legislation, like the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (SLUSA), among others.35  These federal reactions to shareholder 
 
30. See, e.g., Wei Jiang, Reforming the Delaware Law to Address Appraisal Arbitrage, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 12, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/12/reforming-the-delaware-law-to-address-appraisal-
arbitrage/ [https://perma.cc/5S9W-TJ9X]. 
31. These 2016 amendments included a de minimus requirement for appraisal petitions as well 
as the ability to prepay uncontested portions of the appraisal consideration in order to reduce interest 
liability.  The de minimus requirement turned out to be ineffectual as appraisal petitions by professional 
investors easily exceeded the statute’s requirements.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019). 
32. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 135, 170; Takeover Litigation 2012, supra note 3, at 
1–2; Takeover Litigation 2015, supra note 3, at 3; Great Game, supra note 3, at 484–86. 
33. Takeover Litigation 2012, supra note 3, at 1–2 (finding that almost 92% of all transactions 
with a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012); Takeover Litigation 2015, supra 
note 3, at 3 (finding that 94.9% of all transactions with a value greater than $100 million experienced 
litigation in 2014). 
34. The economic incentives that give rise to the abuse of shareholder class action litigation are 
well known.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
35. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105–353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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litigation had the unintended effect of pushing these cases into state courts in 
large numbers.36 
As the volume of transaction-related litigation ramped up, state courts, 
particularly Delaware, stepped in to reduce the high-powered incentives 
associated with this litigation and push it out of the courtrooms.37  Through the 
late 1990s and 2000s litigants brought “good faith” claims.  In a typical good 
faith claim, litigants attempted to argue that directors’ failure to get the highest 
price reasonably available in a sale transaction amount to a violation of their 
duties under Revlon and its progeny.38  Plaintiffs usually alleged that 
unconflicted directors’ actions fell so far short of their obligations under Revlon 
as to constitute of a violation of their duty of good faith.39  A successful good 
faith claim could, by the alchemy of motion pleading, convert what was 
otherwise an exculpable duty of care claim into a non-exculpable good faith 
claim (i.e., money for nothing).  In Lyondell v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme 
Court ruled that Revlon did not require directors to take any specific actions in 
order to comport with its requirements, thus effectively putting an end to good 
faith claims of this type.40 
Following the end of the wave of good faith litigation, litigants’ strategies 
shifted to disclosure claims and disclosure settlements.  In typical disclosure 
litigation, plaintiffs allege directors failed to disclose material information prior 
to a stockholder vote to approve a merger.  Litigants and directors then agree to 
 
36. Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *4 n.21 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 19, 2018) (citing In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)). 
37. One effect of Delaware’s attempts to filter out low-quality claims was that litigants continued 
to bring these claims, but outside of Delaware.  See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is 
Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 605, 607 (2012).  In response, firms 
began to adopt exclusive forum provisions in an effort to corral low-quality cases into a jurisdiction 
that could efficiently manage their disposal.  See Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo 
Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 141 (2011); Verity 
Winship, Contracting Around Securities Litigation: Some Thoughts on the Scope of Litigation Bylaws, 
68 SMU L. REV. 913, 914–15 (2015). 
38. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179–80 (Del. 
1986); see, e.g., In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11027-CB, 2017 WL 1956955, at *7 
(Del. Ch. May 11, 2017). 
39. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179–80. 
40. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“But . . . there are no legally 
prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.  Thus, the directors’ failure to 
take any specific steps during the sale process could not have demonstrated a conscious disregard of 
their duties.”). 
 
QUINN PENA_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:48 PM 
2019] APPRAISAL CONFUSION 467 
 
 
settle the claim with the directors making additional disclosures to the proxy 
statement and attorney fees in exchange for a global release of claims from the 
plaintiff class.  Because settlement hearings are not adversarial in nature, these 
“disclosure-only” settlements were regularly approved by the courts.  So 
efficient was this litigation/settlement strategy in generating fees for plaintiffs’ 
counsel that at its highest, 96% of all public company merger transactions were 
accompanied by litigation.41  In 2016, Chancellor Bouchard of the Delaware 
Chancery Court refused to approve a proposed settlement in front of the court 
as well as future proposed settlements unless the disclosures secured by the 
settlement were “plainly material,” thus reducing the value of disclosure only 
litigation considerably.42  Trulia, thus, marked the end of disclosure-only 
litigation strategies.43 
With Trulia cutting off disclosure-only settlements, litigants developed 
other strategies to pursue transaction-related claims.44  For example, some 
plaintiffs pursued Revlon claims as post-closing damages actions rather than 
pre-closing claims seeking injunctive relief.45  Since courts proved reluctant to 
provide injunctive relief or approve settlements, litigants hoped that 
imperfections in the deal process might result in the court applying enhanced 
scrutiny to deals, leading to provable damages post-closing on a Revlon or 
quasi-appraisal theory.46  In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, however, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware applied principles of common law stockholder 
 
41. Shifting Tides, supra note 2, at 608; Great Game, supra note 32, at 485. 
42. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99, 907 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
43. Trulia has been adopted by other state courts where litigants had been bringing such claims.  
See, e.g., Griffith v. Quality Distrib. Inc., No. 2D17-3160, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 9879, at *18–19 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018); Bushansky v. Phoenix Cos., No. X08FSTCV156027891S, 2017 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 370, at *16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2017); In re Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., No. 16-CVS-3669, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 61, at *18–19 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 20, 
2018). 
44. These strategies include bringing disclosure-only claims in federal court as settlements of 
Section 14(a) proxy disclosure claims.  See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 
721 (7th Cir. 2016); Shifting Tides, supra note 2, at 605. 
45. Disclosure claims are direct claims.  Consequently, unlike derivative claims, they survive 
closing. 
46. A “quasi-appraisal” is a post-closing class action in which plaintiffs make the argument that 
due to disclosure deficiencies by the board, the plaintiffs did not seek an appraisal.  Consequently, the 
entire class of shareholders should be entitled to a remedy of the same type that would have been 
available to them had the board made adequate disclosure and all the shareholders in the class had 
sought an appraisal.  In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42–48 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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ratification to such claims.47  Where directors are not conflicted and fully-
informed, uncoerced stockholders have approved the merger, courts would 
grant the board’s decision to enter into the transaction the deferential 
presumption of business judgment.48  Corwin largely shut the door to most post-
closing damages and quasi-appraisal claims.49 
A series of doctrinal inconsistencies with respect to pleading burdens in the 
context of controller freeze-out transactions, created yet another avenue for 
plaintiffs to bring claims for little more than their settlement value.  Then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine observed in Cox Communications that the incentives worked 
so nicely that almost any controller freeze-out merger would be guaranteed 
litigation no matter how scrupulous the controller was in structuring the 
transaction.50  Indeed, almost every controller freeze-out transaction was 
accompanied by litigation.51  The doctrinal inconsistencies were mostly 
remedied in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., thus reducing high-powered 
incentives to bring litigation on announcement of freeze-out mergers.52 
Across the board, over the past decade or so, courts have been pushing back 
against a seeming tidal wave of litigation, much of which was, at least in the 
view of the courts, of low quality.  To be clear, all of these doctrinal openings 
that litigants sought to exploit were creations of the court itself.  As the courts 
closed off access to one litigation strategy, litigants moved to another.53 
 
47. 125 A.3d 304, 309–11 (Del. 2015). 
48. Id. 
49. In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11027-CB, 2017 WL 1956955, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
May 11, 2017) (involving a quasi-appraisal action alleging a variety of disclosure problems.); see also 
Ignacio E. Salceda, Clarity on the “Quasi Appraisal” Remedy and Post-Closing Claims, HARV. L. SCH 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 31, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/31/clarity-on-the-quasi-appraisal-remedy-and-post-closing-
claims [https://perma.cc/4S7S-XY9A]. 
50. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005) (finding 
because the burden of proof in controlling shareholder freezeout transactions shifted from defendants 
to plaintiffs to prove that the transaction was not entirely fair, the pleading burdens effectively 
guaranteed that every transaction would attract litigation that could not easily be dismissed no matter 
how pristine the defendant board’s process or motives). 
51. Id. at 631–32. 
52. 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
53. Professors Davidoff and Thomas argue correctly that a misalignment of takeover doctrine is 
responsible for incentives for professional litigants to bring claims during the post-hostile takeover era.  
Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover Standards, 
in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 29, 29–30 (Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019). 
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Appraisal arbitrage is yet another litigation strategy.  Shareholder 
ownership recordkeeping is generally antiquated.  When put under pressure by 
relatively large numbers of appraisal petitions, the problems associated with 
shareholder recordkeeping were exposed.54  Appraisal arbitrage takes 
advantage of a statutory loophole that permits a dissident to purchase shares 
and seek an appraisal after a deal is announced and even after the record date 
for the merger is set.55  This loophole permits financial investors to scan merger 
announcements and where their analysis suggests the announced merger is 
underpriced to accumulate a significant block of stock and then seek an 
appraisal.  The rapid increase in appraisal actions identified by Professors 
Korsmo and Myers can be attributed to this arbitrage strategy.56  The additional 
burden on the Chancery Court associated with the rapid rise in these petitions 
exposed some of the structural weaknesses in the appraisal remedy.  When the 
number of petitions were few and the amounts at stake relatively small, litigants 
could accept judicial fair value determinations that might occasionally appear 
arbitrary.  However, with the arrival of large financial investors engaging in 
arbitrage strategies, the cost of judicial mistake became more pronounced.  All 
of this combined to create at least the perception that appraisal arbitrageurs were 
abusing the remedy.57 
Not surprisingly, the courts moved to close off the financial incentives that 
gave rise to the appraisal arbitrage strategy.  With respect to appraisal, the 
doctrinal battlefield the court found itself fighting on was “fair value.”  By 
giving greater importance to the merger price, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
sought to reduce incentives for professional litigants to bring these actions.  
While seemingly effective, these moves by the court bring with them 
complexities that confuse doctrinal development more than necessary. 
III. THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AND ITS PURPOSE 
Modern appraisal is a statutory creature.58  Until 1899, a merger of any 
corporation required the unanimous consent of all stockholders.  Under the 
 
54. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 36 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
55. Id. 
56. Korsmo & Myers, Merits, supra note 1, at 889 (finding that appraisal arbitrage claims tend 
to be brought against lower priced transactions). 
57. See, e.g., Norwitz, supra note 2. 
58. For brief histories of the appraisal statute, see Kanda & Levmore, supra note 16, at 446–51 
and Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 
420, 420–22 (1930), among others. 
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common law approach to mergers, a single shareholder could hold up a 
transaction and prevent a merger from going forward.59  With the recognition 
that merger activity is on balance socially beneficial, corporate laws were 
amended to be more liberal with respect to their approval thresholds.60  First, 
super-majorities, and then simple majorities became the norm.61  As stock was 
mostly the consideration of choice, when a shareholder dissented from a 
merger, the objection, at least in part, could be to the fact that the merger would 
leave the stockholder as a continuing stockholder in a vastly different entity 
 
59. Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN. L. 
REV. 661, 666 (1998); 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
908–09 (2d ed. 1886) (“A corporation cannot consolidate with another company, even pursuant to 
legislative authority, except with the consent of all its shareholders.”). 
60. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del Ch. 1934).  The court in Chicago Corp. 
summarized the history of appraisal thusly: 
What is the purpose of provisions of statutes which provide for the appraisement 
of the stock of a person who objects to the merger of his corporation with another?  
At common law it was in the power of any single stockholder to prevent a merger.  
When the idea became generally accepted that, in the interest of adjusting 
corporate mechanisms to the requirements of business and commercial growth, 
mergers should be permitted in spite of the opposition of minorities, statutes were 
enacted in state after state which took from the individual stockholder the right 
theretofore existing to defeat the welding of his corporation with another.  In 
compensation for the lost right a provision was written into the modern statutes 
giving the dissenting stockholder the option completely to retire from the 
enterprise and receive the value of his stock in money.  Most of the statutes 
provide that what the unwilling stockholder who refuses to accept an interest in 
the consolidated enterprise shall be paid is the “value” of his stock. . . . 
 When a stockholder buys stock it is to be supposed that he buys into a 
corporation as a going concern.  He does not buy on the theory that he is about to 
participate in a contemplated liquidation of the corporation’s assets.  He buys an 
aliquot share of a business, and he probably takes into account, or should at least 
take into account, not alone its present asset condition and earning power but as 
well its future prospects as a continuing enterprise.  When a merger proposal is 
put through with which he chooses to dissociate himself, he is forced out of his 
investment and compelled to abandon his association with a business of which he 
was a past owner.  As to him, the going concern is done.  Others have decreed its 
cessation against his will.  What he has been deprived of is his proportional share 
of an active enterprise which but for the compulsion of others he could continue 
to be associated with in the indefinite future.  What he is deprived of is what he 
should be paid for. 
61. Folk, III, supra note 21, at 790 (“Prior to 1969, the Delaware statute required approval by 
‘two-thirds of the total number of the outstanding shares of the capital stock.’”).  For an example of 
modern merger approval requirements, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2019). 
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with different management and goals than the entity in which the shareholder 
initially invested.62 
In such situations, absent a blocking right, the dissenting shareholder should 
have the right to receive the fair value of their shares in the merged entity in 
cash so that they might be liberated from the now acquired corporation.63  In 
exchange for giving up the power to block an unwanted merger, revised 
corporate law statutes provided dissenting shareholders with the right to cash 
out their position from the merged entity.64  The purpose of the appraisal right, 
then, was to provide liquidity to dissident shareholders who found themselves 
involuntarily shareholders of a successor corporation.65 
The appraisal statute has never been sacrosanct.  The statute, as originally 
conceived, has evolved over time, having been amended twenty-nine times 
since the last major revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law in 
1967.66  Indeed in the early 1970’s, the Delaware legislature was said to be on 
the cusp of eliminating appraisal as a remedy altogether.67 
The “market out exception” to the appraisal statute, the bane of corporate 
law students everywhere, was similarly the subject of a good deal of revision.  
In 1967, the Delaware legislature adopted an exception that withdrew appraisal 
rights from dissenting shareholders in publicly-traded corporations on the 
theory that dissenting shareholders in publicly traded companies could simply 
sell their shares into the market if they were unhappy with the consideration 
offered in a merger.68  Subsequent amendments to the market out exception 
 
62. The shift to other forms of consideration is a relatively recent phenomenon.  For example, in 
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., the court characterized a merger in the following way: “Speaking 
generally, a merger effects an exchange of shares of stock in a going concern for shares in another 
going concern.”  93 A.2d 107, 113 (Del. 1952). 
63. Wertheimer, supra note 59, at 661; MORAWETZ, supra note 59, at 909. 
64. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 77–
78 (1976) (concluding that the appraisal right arose out of a need to reconcile tensions between the 
majority shareholders’ rights “to make drastic changes in the enterprise to meet new conditions as they 
arise, with the need to protect the minority against being involuntarily dragged along into a drastically 
restructured enterprise in which it has no confidence”). 
65. Wertheimer, supra note 59, at 662. 
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (2019). 
67. Folk, III, supra note 21, at 795 (observing that “[i]t is common knowledge that appraisal 
rights are largely on the way out”). 
68. Id.; 56 Del. Laws, c. 50, § 262(k) (1967–68): 
This section shall not apply to the shares of any class of stock which, at the record 
date fixed to determine the stockholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote 
at the meeting of stockholders at which the agreement of merger or consolidation 
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restored appraisal rights to shareholders in publicly traded corporations where 
something other than stock of the acquiring corporation or another publicly 
traded corporation was the consideration (e.g., cash).69 
Under earlier forms of appraisal, the value of a dissenter’s shares were 
determined not by a judge but by an independent appraiser.70  The sole function 
of a court in an appraisal proceeding was to select an appraiser and then ensure 
the dissident shareholder received their pro-rata share of the corporation’s 
value.71  Modern appraisal statutes have moved away from appointing 
appraisers and now leave the work of determining fair value of the dissident’s 
shares in the hands of law-trained judges rather than professional appraisers, 
though it is not at all clear that law-trained judges have any sort of comparative 
advantage at valuation.72 
Through these amendments, the modern appraisal statute has moved 
significantly away from appraisal’s original purposes of providing dissenting 
stockholders liquidity (e.g., cash for their shares rather than stock of the 
acquirer).  Indeed, the modern market out exception appears to turn appraisal 
 
is to be acted on, were either (1) registered on a national securities exchange, or 
(2) held of record by not less than 2,000 stockholders, unless the certificate of 
incorporation of the corporation issuing such stock shall otherwise provide; nor 
shall this section apply to any of the shares of stock of the constituent corporation 
surviving a merger if the merger did not require for its approval the vote of the 
stockholders of the surviving corporation, as provided in subsection (f) of section 
251 of this title.  This subsection shall not be applicable to stockholders of a 
corporation whose stock in a constituent corporation was not converted by the 
merger or consolidation solely into stock of the corporation resulting from or 
surviving a merger pursuant to sections 251 or 252 of this title. 
Id. (emphasis omitted).  
69. 57 Del. Laws, c. 148, §§ 27–29 (1969–70). 
70. 63 Del. Laws, c. 25, § 14 (1981–82). 
71. 56 Del. Laws, c. 50, § 262(c) (1967–68). 
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019).  In moving the power to determine value to the 
judge, the legislature justified it in the following manner: 
At present, the statute requires the court to appoint an appraiser who is charged 
with the obligation of determining the fair or intrinsic value of the stock which is 
being appraised.  Then, if either party disagrees with the appraiser’s findings, the 
party has the right to have his exceptions heard in the Court of Chancery.  
Experience has shown this two-step procedure to be wasteful of time and money.  
Thus, proposed modifications to [section] 262(e) through [section] 262(g) 
provide for the streamlining of the appraisal process by the elimination of the 
appraiser.  The action will now be heard by the Court of Chancery in the first 
instance. 
H.B. 916, 128th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Del. 1976). 
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on its head.  Pursuant to the market out exception, stockholders receiving 
publicly traded stock or stock of the surviving corporation as consideration have 
no appraisal rights.73  In modern appraisal statutes, a stockholder receiving 
unlisted shares of the surviving entity would not have access to an appraisal 
remedy.  Illiquid stock consideration is precisely the kind of consideration that 
gave rise to the need for an appraisal remedy.  That stockholders receiving such 
stock must be forced to hold it or, in the absence of liquid markets, sell it at a 
discount raises serious questions about the remedy’s ongoing purpose. 
On the other hand, stockholders receiving private third-company stock or 
cash consideration get appraisal rights.74  Cash, of course, is the most liquid of 
all assets.  The availability of appraisal rights for cash transactions appears at 
odds with appraisal’s initial purpose—to provide liquidity to shareholders 
forced to accept stock of an acquirer against their will as part of a merger. 
Rather than liberate shareholders from an unwanted, illiquid shareholding 
position resulting from a merger, with its focus on providing fair value for cash 
transactions, the modern appraisal statute seeks to provide deterrence against 
minority oppression where a board might require minority stockholders to 
accept an amount of consideration that is too low.75  This goal is especially clear 
when one observes that dissenting shareholders in Section 253 short form 
mergers have access to the appraisal remedy without regard to the form of 
consideration or whether the corporation is public or private.76  The market out 
exception is not applicable to a short form merger.  In a short form merger, 
minority shareholders can be cashed out by a controlling shareholder who owns 
more than 90% of the outstanding stock without a vote and without prior notice.  
A Section 253 short form merger is inherently unfair to minority shareholders, 
and minority shareholders are susceptible to opportunistic behavior by a 
controller.77  The universal availability of the appraisal remedy for shareholders 
in Section 253 has the effect of providing shareholders a legal remedy against 
opportunism by the majority. 
Providing a counterweight to minority oppression is, of course, a laudable 
goal.  However, this goal calls into question the efficacy of the market out 
exception.  Minority shareholders can be forced to accept less than fair value 
 
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2019). 
74. In a reverse triangular merger, where consideration is stock of a privately held parent, 
stockholders of the disappearing corporation will have appraisal rights.  Id. 
75. Fischel, supra note 16, at 879 (suggesting that the appraisal discourages opportunistic 
behavior by parties). 
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(d) (2019). 
77. Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247–48 (Del. 2001). 
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for their shares without regard to the form of the consideration offered.  The 
retort that an unhappy shareholder receiving publicly traded stock in the 
acquirer can simply sell her shares into the market rather than accept what they 
might perceive as an unfair price for the shares seems like weak tea when 
stockholders are potentially receiving private company shares in the surviving 
entity. 
To the extent modern appraisal statutes suffered from doctrinal or practical 
infirmities, they mostly went unnoticed for many years.  The remedy was little 
used with a version of the “Wall Street Rule” governing shareholder behavior 
for the most part.78  Given the relative paucity of appraisal petitions and the 
generally low stakes of the claims involved, whatever the doctrinal or practical 
weaknesses of the appraisal remedy there were could be overcome on a case by 
case basis.79  However, when the number of appraisal claims rocketed in the 
past decade, particularly among publicly traded merger targets, the frailties of 
the system became evident. 
A. Appraisal’s Statutory Fair Value Requirement 
Under title 8, section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(Section 262), stockholders of a constituent corporation dissenting from a 
merger who perfect their rights are entitled to receive judicial appraisal of their 
stock.80  For shareholders who have perfected their rights, the Court of 
Chancery is required to independently determine the “fair value” of the shares 
by considering all relevant factors, excluding “any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”81 
 
78. Louis Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stick and a Carrot, 7 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 251, 251 (1988) (“The Wall Street Rule, which has been immutable for as long as any of 
us can remember, dictates that shareholders not take an active role in corporate affairs.  Love’em or 
leave’em.”). 
79. Prof. Seligman reported that between 1972 and 1981, there were 16,479 completed mergers 
in the United States and that there were only “twenty or so” reported appraisal opinions (approximately 
0.1%).  Seligman, supra note 22, at 829. 
80. Perfecting one’s appraisal rights requires the shareholder, in a merger where the shareholder 
is receives consideration other than publicly traded stock, to comport with a number of procedural 
requirements, including making a demand on the board, not voting in favor of the merger or accepting 
consideration, and then holding their shares through the effective date of the merger.  DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 262 (2019). 
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019); In the Matter of the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 
A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992). 
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Fair value, under section 262(h), is a term of art.82  Despite its inclusion in 
the original 1899 appraisal statute,83 the meaning of “value” remained an issue 
for the court until the seminal Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye decision.84  There, 
the court established that “[t]he basic concept of value under the appraisal 
statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken 
from him [as of the merger date], viz., his proportionate interest in a going 
concern.”85  In establishing value of the dissenter’s shares, courts have 
traditionally approached this exercise by evaluating the corporation as an 
“operating entity,”86 rather than through the lens of a sale to a third party 
acquirer.87  The policy behind this general rule of paying shareholders their pro-
rata share of a going concern is consistent with appraisal’s goal of protecting 
against minority oppression.88  In that sense, most appraisal decisions premise 
 
82. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware 
Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 124 (2005). 
83. See 21 Del. Laws c. 273, § 56 (1899); Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 
357, 360 (Del. 1997) (citing that the statutory appraisal remedy was created in 1899).  It should also 
be noted that the 1899 statute did not include the term “fair value”; rather, it made mention of “value.” 
21 Del. Laws c. 273, § 56 (1899). 
84. 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).  The fact that no court had been asked to resolve the question of 
“value” for 50 years following passage of the act suggests that for at least the first 50 years of the 
appraisal statute’s existence, the goal of the provision was more liquidity than protection against 
minority oppression. 
85. Id.  When assessing the going concern of the company or operating entity, courts also 
consider its “market position and future prospects.”  See Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
19598, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005). 
86. See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 554 (Del. 2000); Cavalier Oil Corp. 
v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 
2014 WL 2042797, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2014). 
87. See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).  Consistent with the going concern approach, appraisal 
valuations do not apply minority discounts to dissenting shares.  See Richard A. Booth, Minority 
Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 131 (2001) (explaining 
that “the term minority discount as properly understood refers to a discount from the price that would 
be set for non-control shares in an active market simply because they are minority shares and have no 
power to influence the governance of the corporation and may therefore be exposed to the possibility 
of looting”). 
88. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999).  The Finkelstein 
court put it best: 
The idea that stockholders should share pro rata to their ownership in the firm’s 
going concern value is designed, or so it seems, to protect against exploitation by 
insiders with the power to time mergers.  In the real world, if a firm is worth $100, 
has 100 shares, and one stockholder owns 51 shares, and 49 other people each 
own one share, the 51 shares, as a bloc, could be worth $70 and the remaining 
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their valuation analysis on the “notion that the stockholder is entitled to be paid 
for that which has been taken from him.”89 
Before the 1983 decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,90 Delaware courts 
exclusively measured the going concern value using the “Delaware Block 
Method.”91  The Delaware Block Method was a judicially created valuation 
method that had no basis in finance theory.92  In the Delaware Block Method, 
the court was first required to calculate the value of the corporation using three 
different approaches: the asset value, the market price of stock, and an earnings 
valuation.93  Next, each valuation was assigned a percentage weight based on 
“each approach’s significance to the nature of the subject corporation’s 
business.”94  Ultimately, the fair value of the dissenting stock was determined 
by adding together the apportioned weight of all three valuations.95 
Weinberger retired the Delaware Block Method as the exclusive method of 
appraisal valuation.96  Under Weinberger’s liberalized approach, a valuation 
technique was valid if it was “generally considered acceptable in the financial 
community.”97  Such methods included the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis,98 the comparable companies approach, the comparable transactions 
 
shares worth $30.  But, in the world of appraisal, the 49 shares are worth $49. 
Finkelstein, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 n.24. 
89. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 19 (Del. 2017) (internal 
quotations omitted).  See also Merion Capital, 2016 WL 7324170, at *12–13.  The reader should note 
that Tri-Continental referred to this principle as “true or intrinsic value.”  See Tri-Continental Corp., 
74 A.2d at 72. 
90. 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). 
91. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 82, at 124 n.26 (providing footnote for seven cases 
between 1950 and 1988 that measured fair value, in whole or in part, using the Delaware Block 
Method). 
92. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712. 
93. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 82, at 124. 
94. See Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 555 (Del. 2000). 
95. Id. 
96. See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del. 2017). 
97. See Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 174 (Del. 1991). 
98. The DCF method determines the present value of a company by measuring its projected 
future cash flows.  The following is a more detailed description by the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows 
that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a terminal or residual 
value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the firm’s 
cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which 
to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated 
terminal or residual value. 
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approach, valuation based on net asset value, and valuation based on a 
combination of these techniques.99  Historically, the DCF analysis was the most 
frequently featured method of valuation because it was regarded as “the 
approach that merits the greatest confidence within the financial 
community.”100 
Unlike other kinds of shareholder litigation, in an appraisal action, both 
parties must bear “the burden of proving their respective valuation positions by 
a preponderance of evidence.”101  The trial court, as finder of fact, reserves the 
right to cast its own determination of value when expert testimony is found to 
be unreliable or at odds.102  This unique procedural aspect of appraisal gives 
rise to what has become known as the “battle of experts.”  In Kahn v. Household 
Acquisition Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court made the first reference to the 
“battle of experts” in its appraisal jurisprudence.103  There, the court tasked itself 
with reviewing a complex independent valuation by the Chancery Court.104  
Noting that each expert’s valuation technique was subject to criticism, the court 
upheld the Chancery Court’s analysis of all relevant factors, citing that it was 
entitled to “draw its own conclusions from the evidence.”105  This holding is an 
example of the court taking matters into its own hands when it believes that the 
 
Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 
47 DUKE L.J. 613, 628 (1998). 
99. Id. at 628–29; Timothy W. Gregg & Rebecca L. Butcher, The Latest Significant Delaware 
Appraisal Decisions and Potential Effects on Appraisal Litigation, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2015, at 1, 1–
2. 
100. Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. Civ.A. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (internal quotation omitted). 
101. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999). 
102. See Cede & Co., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (noting that the court must use its own independent 
judgement if neither party satisfied its burden of proof); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 
1146 (Del. 1989) (noting that the “independent valuation approach [is] consistent with the Court of 
Chancery’s expanded role as the trier of fact in appraisal proceedings,” when an expert’s methodology 
lacks a “reliable factual premise”); Gilbert v. MPM Enters., 709 A.2d 663, 667 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(footnote omitted) (holding that “[s]ince neither party is entitled to any preference or presumption in 
this proceeding, the underlying assumptions that drive these valuations must be tested equally to ensure 
all that relevant facts were properly and reasonably considered”). 
103. 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991). 
104. The Chancery Court tested an adjusted asset-based valuation by (1) concluding that the 
price/earnings and DCF approach were inapplicable due to the company’s volatile strike history and 
lack of comparable companies, (2) fixing asset value as the foundation for fair value due to the 
companies particular industry, and (3) adjusting assets “to reflect the realities of . . . [a] third party 
sale.”  Id. 
105. Id. 
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reliability of the expert appraisal process is in question.  The court in Kahn 
confirmed its standard for future appellate review holding that it would not 
disturb the lower court’s valuation decision if it was the “product of a logical 
and orderly deductive process.”106 
A year later, the Delaware Supreme Court would have another opportunity 
to opine on the increasing lack of reliable valuation outputs from the battle of 
the experts.  In Shell, the court reflected upon the recurring “clash of contrary, 
and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value.”107  The court had harsh words 
for battles of experts, stating that such presentations handicap the Court of 
Chancery’s analysis because they are limited to widely divergent partisan 
views.108  The court suggested that the Chancery Court might consider returning 
to the practice of appointing their own valuation experts where it was 
determined that more objective evidence was required.109 
Ten years after Weinberger, Delaware courts appeared to be forging their 
own judicially created valuation methodologies far more than they were 
selecting an expert’s model in toto, thus embracing a rather dubious version of 
a valuation’s art than its science.110  In M.G. Bancorporation, the court 
reminded practitioners and future courts that the “ultimate selection of a 
valuation framework is within the Court of Chancery’s discretion.”111  
Whenever the Chancery Court fashions its own valuation framework,112 M.G. 
Bancorporation instructs that it be (1) plausibly corroborated by “whatever 
reliable” evidence on the record, and (2) the result of an orderly and logical 
 
106. Id.  Upon a Westlaw search of all the Delaware Supreme Court cases before Kahn, it appears 
that the first appraisal decision to use “orderly and logical deductive process” was Alabama By-Prods. 
Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 259 (Del. 1991).  Given that this case was decided in the previous year, 
Kahn’s reference to its language appears to have validated the appraisal abuse of discretion standard 
moving forward. 
107. In the Matter of the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1221. 
111. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 524 (Del. 1999) (the petitioner offered 
more than one valuation model).  
112. It is worth noting that value determination does not need to be “completely separate and 
apart from the valuations performed by the parties’ expert[s]” to be considered the court’s own 
valuation methodology, as was the case here.  See id. at 526.  Therefore, so long as the court does not 
adopt an expert’s valuation model, in toto, any other methodology used is generally considered to be 
part of the court’s own judicially-created valuation calculation (e.g., part of the valuation could be 
calculated by “adapting or blending the factual assumptions [or framework] of the parties’ experts”).  
See id. at 524, 526. 
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deductive process.113  The frameworks adopted by courts since then can best be 
characterized as a modified Delaware Block Method.  Courts will take a variety 
of commonly used valuation methodologies and then generate a valuation using 
a weighted average of the various methodologies.  In Orchard Enterprises, 
then-Chancellor Strine observed that such an approach was anything but orderly 
and logical: 
As a law-trained judge who has to come up with a valuation 
deploying the learning of the field of corporate finance, I 
choose to deploy one accepted method as well as I am able, 
given the record before me and my own abilities.  Even if one 
were to conclude that there are multiple ways to come up with 
a discount rate, that does not mean that one should use them all 
at one time and then blend them together.  Marc Vetri, Mario 
Batali, and Lidia Bastianich all make a mean marinara sauce.  
Is the best way to serve a good meal to your guest to cook up 
each chef’s recipe and then pour them into a single huge pot?  
Or is it to make the hard choice among the recipes and follow 
the chosen one as faithfully as a home cook can?  This home 
cook will follow the one recipe approach and use the recipe 
endorsed by Brealey, Myers and Allen and the mainstream of 
corporate finance theory taught in our leading academic 
institutions . . . .114 
Post-Weinberger courts remained vexed by valuation.  Although courts began 
to rely on discounted cash flows as one valuation model, they also continued to 
employ other valuation models, often relying on weighted average approaches 
amongst the various models in order to generate a value that reflected an 
amalgamation of each of these different models.  As a consequence, judicial 
valuations, no matter how well backed by expert opinions, continued to lack 
rigor and were often no more than guesswork. 
IV. COURTS PUSH BACK AGAINST ARBITRAGE 
When the amount of appraisal litigation was limited, the creaky 
jurisprudential scaffolding that grew up around the appraisal statute, including 
the sometimes-dubious valuation methodologies, was sufficient for the purpose.  
 
113. Id. at 525; see also In the Matter of the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 
(Del. 1992); Booth, supra note 87, at 131. 
114. In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *18 
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
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However, with the pressure of more litigation as documented by Korsmo and 
Myers, the shortcomings of the appraisal infrastructure became apparent.115  In 
reaction to the dramatic increase in appraisal litigation, the courts have been 
engaged in an effort to reduce incentives for shareholders to bring these 
appraisal actions.  As discussed above, the battlefield upon which these recent 
appraisal wars have been fought has been “fair value.” 
In a series of recent cases, Delaware courts have attempted to reduce 
incentives for litigants to treat appraisal as a judicial option by putting a thumb 
on the fair value lever.  In Golden Telecom, DFC, and then Dell v. Magnetar, 
the Delaware Supreme Court, though stopping short of adopting a presumption 
in favor of merger price, made it clear that judges should lean heavily on merger 
price when determining fair value in an appraisal.  Where a judge decides not 
to rely on merger price, the court has placed an obligation on the trial court to 
justify her decision to rely on other factors to determine fair value.  While the 
court may hope the effect of leaning on merger price is to reduce the option 
value of appraisal, the court’s reliance on merger price and pristine deal process 
though short of a presumption may ultimately prove misguided. 
In Golden Telecom, the Chancery Court conceded that an “arms-length 
merger price resulting from an effective market check is entitled to great weight 
in an appraisal,” but refused to extend such rule to the case at hand given the 
lack of reliability attributed to the sale process.116  First, it considered the 
market’s scrutiny of the acquired company (Golden Telecom) following the 
announcement of its merger with VimpelCom.117  Second, the court rebuffed 
the respondent’s contention that the deal price in the case before it was the result 
of transparent and effective sale process.118  Third, the court distinguished the 
 
115. See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1551. 
116. Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507–08 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
117. See id. at 505–06 (highlighting the unusual rise in VimpelCom’s stock price following the 
merger announcement, Golden Telecom’s downgrading in rating by Morgan Stanley, Renaissance 
Capital’s quasi-financial opinion indicating that the acquired company’s low debt made it inherently 
more valuable in the telecommunications world, and evidence from a number of other market analysists 
who believed Golden Telecom was not receiving a good deal via the merger price). 
118. See id. at 508–10 (criticizing the market check by pointing to (1) the Special Committee’s 
sole focus on securing the best deal possible from VimpelCom alone, (2) the inherent conflict posited 
by Golden Telecom’s two largest stockholders and their significant stake in VimpelCom’ stock and 
board of directors, (3) that conflict’s impact on potentially discouraging third-party bidders, and (4) a 
lack of public guarantee from the two conflicted stockholders that they would support a topping bid 
over that of VimpelCom). 
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case before it from Union Illinois119 and Highfields Capital,120 where the deal 
price, in both those scenarios, “resulted from a competitive and fair auction, 
which followed a more-than-adequate sales process and involved broad 
dissemination of confidential information to a large number of prospective 
buyers.”121  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court suggested that the 
circumstances surrounding the merger process made the transaction more like 
one proposed by a controlling stockholder, than by an arm’s length dealer.122  
So, while the court declined to adopt merger price as presumptive of fair value 
in Golden Telecom, it laid out the conditions under which it might nevertheless 
accept merger price as an indicator of fair value. 
In the years following the Golden Telecom decisions, Delaware opinions 
supporting merger price as the indicator of fair value saw a notable increase.123  
In each of these subsequent cases, where other metrics of valuation were either 
unreliable or not available but where the board was able to demonstrate that the 
deal process was pristine, the court relied exclusively on merger price to 
determine fair value.124  In Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.,125 
the court found deal price to be the most reliable valuation method.  In doing 
so, the court outlined what it believed is required for a pristine deal process.  In 
 
119. Id. at 507–08; Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 358 (Del. Ch. 
2004). 
120. Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d at 508 n.64; Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 
34, 58–59 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
121. See Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d at 507–08 (quoting Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P., 847 A.2d at 
357–58) (distinguishing Union Illinois in its “deal price” section and cites Highfields Capital as a 
corresponding footnote). 
122. Id. 
123. See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that a “series of decisions” following Golden Telecom 
II have considered the deal price valuation methodology). 
124. The 2016 Chancery Decision in Merion Capital stated the following: 
In five decisions since Golden Telecom II, the Court of Chancery has given 
exclusive weight to the deal price, particularly where other evidence of fair value 
was unreliable or weak.  In five other decisions since Golden Telecom II, the court 
has declined to give exclusive weight to the deal price in situations where the 
respondent failed to overcome the petitioner’s attacks on the sale process and 
thus did not prove that it was a reliable indicator of fair value. 
See id. (emphasis added).  The reader should note that two of the post-2010 cases that did not rely 
entirely on deal price were the Chancery Court decisions leading up to both DFC Global Corp v. 
Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven 
Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017). 
125. C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). 
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order for merger price to be a reliable metric for valuation, the process by which 
the company “was marketed to potential buyers was [1] thorough, [2] effective, 
and [3] free from any spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”126  In re Appraisal 
of Ancestry.com, Inc.,127 the Chancery Court added to this developing merger 
price standard by describing the robustness of the auction process as one “that 
is unlikely to have left significant stockholder value unaccounted for.”128  The 
court characterized the sequence of events in the market test leading up to the 
transaction as “logical and as an open door to a range of people.”129  After 
finding that the problematic inputs rendered the DCF and sales projection 
methods unreliable, the Ancestry.com court relied exclusively on the deal price 
methodology.130  Similarly, in Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc.,131 the 
court upheld the use of merger consideration again, finding that the “price 
generated by the market through a thorough and vigorous sales process [was] 
the best indication of fair value under the specific facts presented.”132  There, 
the fluid market test was characterized as one “sufficiently structured to develop 
fair value.”133  This description (and its connection to fair value) demonstrated 
the court’s growing level of comfort with the “merger price standard” as a 
credible indicator of fair value. 
 
126. See id. (dividing implicitly the “deal price” analysis into three buckets by holding that the 
process by which the company “was marketed to potential buyers was [1] thorough, [2] effective, and 
[3] free from any spectre of self-interest or disloyalty”). 
127. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015). 
128. See id. at *16.  In addition, the court in Ancestry.com also accounted for Golden Telecom 
I’s three “deal price” buckets, holding that the “sales process was reasonable, wide-ranging and . . . free 
from the taint of breaches of fiduciary duty.”  See id. 
129. See id. (internal quotations omitted).  The court highlighted the following aspects of the 
five-month long auction process: (1) the acquired company’s financial investor sought potential 
financial sponsors and strategic buyers early on, (2) the financial investor held meetings with fourteen 
potential bidders resulting in seven non-binding bids, (3) the three highest bids were invited to engage 
in a complete due diligence assessment of the target company, (4) the company hired Goldman Sachs 
to support with alternative sale plans after no final bids resulted from the rocky due diligence process, 
and (5) after a final bid was eventually approved by the board, “no topping bid[s] emerged” during the 
two-month period following the announcement, despite there being a “fiduciary out” provision within 
the merger agreement.  Id. at *3–6. 
130. See id. at *23. 
131. C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at *16.  There, the transaction was “negotiated over multiple rounds of bidding among 
interested buyers.”  Id. at *18. 
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Where a defendant board could not demonstrate merger price was a credible 
indicator of fair value due to infirmities in the sales process, or the spectre of 
self-interest or disloyalty, a court is free to rely on other potentially more 
credible indicators of value, like discounted cash flows.134  This point was 
proven in In re Appraisal of Orchard Enterprises, Inc.,135 where the court did 
not award any weight to the deal price given its suspiciously similar 
characteristics to that of a transaction led by a controlling stockholder (i.e., it 
was a going private merger led by a large stockholder).136  In Merion Capital, 
L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., the court refused to give any weight to the merger price 
because the respondent failed to rely on it itself, opting instead to rely on 
discounted cash flows that resulted in a valuation lower than merger price.137  
In Merion Capital, the Chancery Court noted that the reliability of the merger 
price as a valuation method is only as strong as the sale process and market 
environment it derived from.138 
By 2017, Delaware’s “fair value” jurisprudence as deployed by the 
Chancery Court had established a set of factors that were essential to a court’s 
equitable determination that the deal price was the most reliable method of 
valuation.  These factors generally broke down into three categories: (1) the 
effectiveness of the market check, (2) the purity of the sale process, and (3) the 
reliability of the merger price.  Category one involved a review of elements 
such as the adequacy of disclosures,139 the robustness and breadth with which 
 
134. LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at 
*20–21 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (awarding one-hundred percent valuation weight to deal price given 
the existence of a “competitive and fair auction,” while also clarifying that “[a]ny impediments to a 
higher bid resulted from Ramtron’s operative reality, not shortcomings of the [m]erger process”). 
135. C.A. No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012). 
136. See id. at *5.  While the court relied entirely on the DCF valuation method, it expressed 
doubt over the “quality of marketing . . . or the utility of the ‘go shop’ provision contained in the merger 
agreement, which could obviously have been affected by [the controlling stockholder’s] voting power 
and expressed interest to acquire all of Orchard for itself.”  Id.  See also infra notes 192–93, 204. 
137. C.A. No. 6247–VCP, 2013 WL 3793896, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013). 
138. See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (explaining that a transaction “is informative of fair value 
only when it is the product of not only a fair sale process, but also of a well-functioning market”) 
(quoting In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (Del. 
Ch. July 8, 2016), rev’d, 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017)). 
139. See Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., C.A. No. 6293, 1983 WL 103279, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 26, 1983); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 343 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
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the market canvass and subsequent negotiations were conducted,140 the reliance 
upon the advice of independent financial advisors,141 the perpetual threat of 
competition spanning past the signing of the merger, and any other evidence 
tending to prove that the transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective 
market reality.142 
Category two incorporated a search for “fiduciary [or] process 
irregularities,”143 the involvement of controlling or large stockholders,144 the 
conditioning of the transaction on the vote of the majority of disinterested 
stockholders,145 and anything else indicating that the deal price resulted solely 
from arm’s length negotiations free from claims of collusion.146 
Finally, category three emphasized the existence (or lack thereof) of any 
additional bids during the auction process that exceeded the eventual merger 
price,147 valuations based on unaltered management projections that were 
facilitated before or as of the merger date,148 market reactions to the acquiring 
company’s stock price following the leaking or announcement of the merger,149 
 
140. See Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., C.A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 7, 1991). 
141. See In the Matter of the Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1220 (Del. 1992). 
142. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P., 847 A.2d at 343. 
143. Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, 
at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). 
144. Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507–08 (Del. Ch. 2010); Huff Fund 
Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). 
145. See Merion Capital, 2016 WL 7324170, at *32. 
146. In In re Appraisal of PetSmart, the Chancery Court awarded full valuation weight to the 
merger price “[i]n the wake of a robust pre-signing auction among informed, motivated bidders, and 
in the absence of any evidence that market conditions impeded the auction.” C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 
2017 WL 2303599, at *40 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017).  The court attributed these circumstances to the 
result of a proper sales process and healthy performing market.  Id. at *31.  Further, the court contrasted 
its rejection of the DCF valuation model (noting the dispositive existence of unreliable data inputs), 
with the near-perfect reliable indicator that was the transactional process.  Id. at *31–37.  In a telling 
manner, this court listed the following factors as critical to achieving this near-perfect reliable valuation 
model: “[1] meaningful competition among multiple bidders during the pre-signing phase, [2] the 
availability of adequate and reliable information to participants in the auction, [3] the absence of any 
explicit or implicit collusion, and [4] the lack of a topping bid.” Id. at *27 n.338 (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Merion Capital, 2016 WL 7324170, at *16–26). 
147. See Global GT LP, 993 A.2d at 507. 
148. See Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. C.A. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *2 
(Del Ch. Feb. 10, 2004). 
149. See Global GT LP, 993 A.2d at 508–09. 
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and any “structural impediments” that may have prevented a counter bid.150  
After that, the court would corroborate the merger price with each party’s 
purported valuation model to ensure it fell within the range of “reasonable 
value” given the admissible evidence.151  In sum, these three categories (and 
their corresponding factors) were the essential components in determining 
whether merger price was an indicator of fair value prior to DFC152 and Dell.153 
Delaware’s nascent pristine deal process standard was tested by the 2017 
Delaware Supreme Court decision in DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield 
Value Partners, L.P.  There, the lower court’s decision to allocate one-third in 
fair value weight to each of the merger considerations, comparable companies, 
and DCF analyses rather than rely entirely on merger price was reversed and 
remanded in light of its “own findings about the robustness of the market 
check.”154  In declining to establish a presumption in favor of merger price, the 
court held that a competitive market is the “most reliable evidence of 
value . . . so long as interested buyers are given a fair opportunity to price” the 
bid in question.155  The court endorsed the “generally accepted view” by the 
financial community that a single market actor is normally no match for the 
collective value judgment born out of a robust auction process.156  It did so, not 
by citing judicial precedent, but by citing numerous pieces of economic 
literature.157  The logical consequence of such deference to merger price would 
be the weakening of the single-judgment DCF methodology as a credible 
valuation metric; the same methodology that the court had, up to this point, 
consistently held to be “the approach that merits the greatest confidence within 
the financial community.”158  The court did not mince words on this front, 
 
150. See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 52–53, 59 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
151. See Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 357–59 (Del. Ch. 2004); 
supra notes 119–21 and accompany text; infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
152. See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 388 (Del. 2017). 
153. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 23–24 (Del. 
2017). 
154. DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 388. 
155. Id. at 367. 
156. Id. 
157. See id. at 367 nn.104–05.  The citing of the economic literature demonstrated the court’s 
intent to communicate that this standard was backed by legitimate financial principles.  Notably, it 
indicated that this was the first time the deal price had be awarded such weight as a “generally accepted” 
financial principle since the court did not cite to any case precedent. 
158. Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. Civ.A 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
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concluding that “[m]arket prices are typically viewed superior to . . . a single 
person’s discounted cash flow model.”159  The court’s deference for merger 
prices created a de facto presumption of fair value when the deal price is the 
product of a pristine deal process: “Although there is no presumption in favor 
of the deal price,” a transaction resulting from “an open process, informed by 
robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-public information, 
in which many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to bid” 
may be dispositive of fair value.160  This new soft merger price presumption 
renders valuation opinions offered by litigation experts moot unless such 
opinions attack the reliability of the deal process with credible evidence 
supported by the record.161  There are now two broad approaches to successfully 
attacking a supposed arm’s length transaction’s deal price: first, identify any 
impediment or barrier to the transaction, and second, identify any aspect of the 
process that could fall into the category of self-dealing or conflict of interest.162 
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd. presented the 
first formidable challenge to the durability and validity of the pristine deal 
process standard.163  The transaction in Dell involved a management buyout 
(led by the famous Michael Dell) and the affiliates of a private equity firm.164  
As suggested earlier, conflicted merger transactions and the transactions 
involving single bidders raise red flags when evaluating the reliability of merger 
price for valuation purposes.165  The Chancery Court’s decision recognized this 
point, indicating its concerns over several elements typically associated with 
private equity deals: the inadequacy of a market canvass; the disproportionate 
influence of deal protection measures, such as go-shops, on competing bidders; 
and the alleged prioritization of the internal rate-of-return valuation model 
(unique to leveraged buyouts) over the going concern value.166 
 
159. DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 369. 
160. Id. at 349. 
161. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 526 (Del. 1999) (discussing the 
bifurcated approach to the abuse of discretion standard when evaluating the Court of Chancery’s role 
as an independent appraiser). 
162. DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 349. 
163. See 177 A.3d 1, 21–22 (Del. 2017). 
164. Id. at 5. 
165. See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *30 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 508–
09 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
166. Dell, 177 A.3d at 16. 
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The Supreme Court took heed of these concerns but ultimately dismissed 
them altogether.167  Its primary area of disagreement with the trial court’s 
decision was its decision to award zero weight to the merger price.168  The court 
held that there were factors present in Dell’s buyout that suggested the deal 
process was sufficiently pristine as to support merger price as the primary 
indicator of fair value.169  
The Chancery Court refused to assign any citing the following reasons: (1) 
the existence of a “valuation gap” between the stock price and the target 
company’s going concern value; (2) the lack of heavy involvement by strategic 
buyers throughout the process artificially kept the deal price below fair value; 
and (3) several characteristics associated with management buyout go-shops 
negatively impact the reliability of the deal price.170 
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the first under its application of the 
“efficient market hypothesis.”171  This financial theory teaches that a stock price 
forged by an efficient market is typically more reliable than that of a single 
analyst engaged in a battle of experts.172  The factors associated with this test 
are: the existence of many unconflicted stockholders; the lack of a controlling 
stockholder; “highly active trading” (i.e., a public stock exchange); and the 
unimpeded dissemination of all publicly available information to the market.173  
Here, the court found no rational basis to ignore this financial theory given the 
trial court’s failure to identify any of the four aforementioned factors.174  
Specifically, Dell was largely held by common stockholders, was covered by 
numerous market research analysts and market makers, and did not have a 
 
167. Id. at 19. 
168. Id. at 5. 
169. Id. at 5–6.  The court indicated that it would normally defer to the trial court’s findings if 
the valuation had a “reasonable basis in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to 
determining the value of corporations.”  Id.   By concluding otherwise, the court instructs the Chancery 
Court to recognize the existence of factors in this appraisal proceeding that generally contribute to a 
reliable merger price.  This is clearly instructive for future practitioners on both sides of the appraisal 
action.  The scrutiny was presumably higher under this analysis given the characteristics of an 
interested transaction (affecting process purity) and the disproportionate involvement of financial 
bidders (affecting both the market canvass and sale price). 
170. Id. at 23–24. 
171. Id. at 24. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 25. 
174. Id. (noting that “[t]he record before us provides no rational, factual basis for such a 
‘valuation gap,’” before going on to list each of the reasons why). 
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controlling stockholder (despite Mr. Dell’s obvious influence as a founder).175  
Most importantly, the court provided future petitioners with certain elements 
that could be used to attack a deal price valuation.176  One of the newest factors 
considered was the treatment of the target’s confidential information by 
prospective bidders.177  Taken together, the court’s “efficient market 
hypothesis” addresses all three deal price buckets. 
Next, the court dealt with the lack of strategic bidders involved in the sale 
process.  Disagreeing with the Chancery Court, it expressed its confidence that 
financial buyers have just as much incentive to adequately measure fair value 
as strategic buyers do.178  Here, the court gave weight to the consistent 
competition facilitated by Dell’s financial advisors during the pre-canvass and 
post-signing phases as well as the stock market’s treatment of Dell’s prospects 
and profitability.179  The analysis also hinted that an independent committee’s 
success in repeatedly raising a financial sponsor’s bid helps dissuade any notion 
that outside competition is necessary to generate fair value.180  Further, the court 
endorsed the dynamics of the go-shop as “rais[ing] fewer structural barriers than 
the norm,” and attributed this to the provision limiting the financial firm’s 
compensation unless the go-shop was “as effective as possible.”181 
Thus, the fairness of the go-shop, the value placed by public markets, an 
extensive and cooperative due diligence process, the target company’s 
willingness to facilitate competition, and the management’s attempts to 
persuade the market that the company was more valuable than its stock price 
 
175. Id. 
176. These elements include, but were not limited to: a track record of a company’s stock 
reacting to news regarding its internal developments (implying that stock price at the time of the merger 
was an informed one); facts suggesting that relevant financial information did not make its way into 
the market; and facts suggesting that management intentionally persuaded common stockholders to be 
shortsighted in the company’s investment prospects in order to orchestrate a future fire-sale transaction.  
Id. at 25–27. 
177. Id. at 27 (noting that “[t]he record simply does not support the Court of Chancery’s favoring 
of management’s optimism over the public analysts’ and investors’ skepticism—especially in the face 
of management’s track record of missing its own projections”). 
178. Id. at 27–28. 
179. Id. at 28.  Additionally, due to early leaks regarding Dell’s interest in a potential strategic 
transaction, the lack of subsequent interest by strategic buyers during the pre-canvass was deemed to 
be a byproduct of their financial concerns rather than a lack of marketing by the independent 
committee.  Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 29. 
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all constitute “objective indicia of the deal price’s reliability.”182  The court 
found “no rational connection between a buyer’s status as a financial sponsor 
and the question of whether the deal price is a fair price.”183 
Finally, the court explicitly made sure to distinguish the uniqueness of this 
case, noting that only “when the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low 
barriers to entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping 
bidder to have the support of [an influential stockholder’s] votes is so 
compelling” would a failure to assign the deal price any weight under these 
circumstances trigger an abuse of discretion.184  These factors, when contrasted 
against a DCF analysis that undervalued Dell by $23 billion (using over 1,100 
inputs), are why the court believed there to be a tremendous discrepancy in 
reliability.185  Ending on a policy note, the court emphasized that a contrary 
holding would deter the future embrace of the best practices adopted by the 
target company and Mr. Dell.186 
Following Golden Telecom, DFC, and Dell, Delaware has adopted a “light 
touch” presumption with respect to merger price in the appraisal context.  In 
each of these cases, the court made it clear that it favored valuations “forged in 
the crucible of objective market reality” over other approaches.187  However, in 
each of the cases, the court specifically disclaimed a presumption that merger 
price is the correct measure for appraisal valuation.188  Nevertheless, the court 
in DFC and Dell instructed lower courts that they look first to merger price.  To 
the extent a finder of fact wishes to deviate from merger price, the trial court 
must justify that decision based on “reasoning that is consistent with the record 
and with relevant, accepted financial principles.”189  So, while the current state 
 
182. Id. at 30–31. 
183. Id. at 28 (internal quotation omitted). 
184. Id. at 35. 
185. Id. at 36. 
186. Id. at 37–38 (concluding that “[i]f the reward for adopting many mechanisms designed to 
minimize conflict and ensure stockholders obtain the highest possible value is to risk the court adding 
a premium to the deal price based on a DCF analysis, then the incentives to adopt best practices will 
be greatly reduced”). 
187. Id. at 23 n.108 (citing Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., C.A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 29303, at 
*17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991)). 
188. “In DFC, we again rejected an invitation to create a presumption in favor of the deal price.  
Even aside from the statutory command to consider all relevant factors, we doubted our ability to craft 
the precise preconditions for invoking such a presumption.”  Dell, 177 A.3d at 21–22 (footnote 
omitted). 
189. Id. at 44. 
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of fair value jurisprudence leaves the discretion to determine fair value in the 
hands of the trial court, it requires the court to rationalize a decision to move 
away from merger price; consequently, fair value involves a light-touch 
presumption in favor of merger price. 
Since DFC and Dell, the court’s light-touch presumption in favor of merger 
price has had its intended effect.  The number of appraisal petitions in Delaware 
rose every year from 2009 until 2016 when there were seventy-six petitions 
filed.190  In 2018, the number of petitions declined to just twenty-six.191  
Although the court was able, through its deference towards merger price in the 
determination of fair value, to reduce incentives for appraisal arbitrageurs to 
bring appraisal actions, the court may have gone too far. 
V. CHALLENGES TO THE DELAWARE RESPONSE 
There are a number of challenges that arise with the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s retreat to merger price and the pristine deal process standard in 
determining fair value of a dissenter’s stock.  These problems run afoul of 
Delaware precedent and Delaware’s approach to the business judgment rule as 
well as the appraisal statute’s statutory constraints.  In addition, the pristine deal 
process standard raises the unwelcome prospect of unintended consequences 
with respect to board duties in the context of a merger or sale of control. 
A. Merger Price and Section 262(h) 
If one takes seriously Section 262(h)’s charge that the “Court shall 
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger,” then reliance on deal 
price, particularly in the context of a played out auction, runs afoul of the 
statutory limitations placed on judicial fair value calculations.192  The statutory 
prohibition against including elements of value arising out of the merger 
transaction is a reflection of the goals of appraisal.  Appraisal provides 
dissenting shareholders liquidity or deterrence against opportunistic behavior 
by controllers by ensuring dissenters the ability to receive their pro rata share 
in the corporation as a going concern.  To the extent the proposed merger creates 
 
190. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, APPRAISAL LITIGATION IN DELAWARE: TRENDS IN PETITIONS 
AND OPINIONS 2006–2018 1 (2018), https://www.cornerstone.com/publications/reports/appraisal-
litigation-delaware-2006-2018 [https://perma.cc/SB6Y-9N78]. 
191. Id. 
192. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019).  Carney and Sharfman make a similar argument.  
William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls for Deal 
Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 61 (2018). 
QUINN PENA_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:48 PM 
2019] APPRAISAL CONFUSION 491 
 
 
an economic surplus, dissenting shareholders voluntarily forgo that surplus by 
virtue of their appraisal petition. 
Basic bargaining theory suggests, merger price represents a division of the 
buyer’s surplus associated with the transaction.  That is to say, the merger price 
must, by definition, include elements of value arising from the merger.  
Consequently, reliance by courts on merger price for an indication of fair value 
runs contrary to statutory mandate. 
In order to better understand how merger price must include elements of 
value arising from the acquisition, consider how a buyer understands her own 
bidding model.  When a buyer makes a bid on a seller, the bid price will be a 
function of the expected value of the target corporation in the buyer’s hands.  
Bidders can be expected to submit bids according to a decision rule that permits 
bids as long as the bid price does not exceed the expected value of the target.  
The difference between the bidder’s expected value is the transaction surplus 
and the current value of the target corporation.  The bidder’s expected profit 
associated with the transaction is equal to the difference between the expected 
value of the target in the bidder’s hands and the final bid price.  The more of 
the transaction surplus the bidder is able to retain, the higher the bidder’s 
expected profit associated with the transaction.193 
Consequently, in a bilateral negotiation, bargaining over deal price 
represents a mere division of the transaction surplus between the buyer and the 
seller.  Since the transaction surplus is the difference between a seller’s 
minimum reservation price and a buyer’s maximum reservation price, both 
parties will be better off doing the transaction regardless of the ultimate 
distribution of the surplus.  The auction literature demonstrates that, in 
expectation, a seller in a bilateral negotiation will not do better than a fifty-fifty 
split of the transaction surplus.194 
In an active auction for the target corporation where bidders do not know 
the expected values of other bidders, sellers can expect to receive even more of 
the transaction surplus.  The key insight from the auction literature in economics 
 
193. Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 
877–81 (2007). 
194. This is because the buyer’s valuation of the seller is private information known only to the 
buyer, and there is no mechanism by which the buyer can credibly signal to the seller that its statements 
about valuation are more than mere puffery.  Absent a credible commitment device that reveals 
information about the buyer’s valuation of the seller, the exact division of transaction surplus in a 
bilateral negotiation is indeterminate.  Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 1989, at 3, 19. 
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is that competition, or the threat of competition, in the form of an auction will 
lead to a deal price that transfers relatively more of the buyer’s transaction 
surplus to the seller and that the price effect of one additional competitor in an 
auction is greater than the price effects attributable to effective bargaining.195  
The credible threat that the seller in the course of an auction will accept a higher 
bid from an auction competitor causes bidders to reveal private information 
about their valuations of the seller through higher bid prices.196  This is so 
because bidders can only increase their probability of winning an auction where 
other bidders’ valuations are private by transferring transaction surplus from 
buyer to seller.197  “When given the choice between losing a potential 
transaction or giving up some of the expected transaction surplus, rational 
bidders are not indifferent.  A rational bidder will exchange surplus for certainty 
up until the point where the bidder has no additional surplus available from 
pursuing a transaction.”198  Bidders in an auction therefore submit bids that 
transfer increasing amounts of transaction surplus to sellers in exchange for a 
higher probability of success in an auction.  Consequently, the winning bidder 
in an auction is one with the highest valuation of the seller, and the winning 
bidder can be expected to have transferred its transaction surplus to the selling 
 
195. Bulow and Klemperer show that, subject to certain assumptions, a standard English auction 
with N + 1 bidders will always yield higher expected revenue than a negotiation with only N bidders.  
Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180, 185–86 
(1996) (noting an auction with N + 1 bidders and no reserve price is more profitable than any standard 
mechanism with only N bidders).  Bulow and Klemperer also show that an auction with N + 1 bidders 
is superior to any mechanism involving only N bidders.  Id. (same).  
196. Because the seller does not know the buyer’s private valuation of the seller, the seller’s 
ability to bargain is limited.  R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 699, 704 (1987).  The seller can, however, exploit competition among bidders, or 
potential bidders, to drive up the price closer to the buyer’s reservation price.  Id.  
197. This assumes symmetric bidders, and on the one side a seller with no bargaining power 
running an English auction with no reserve price, and on the other side a seller with all the bargaining 
power, including the ability to make binding commitments, conducting a negotiation or an auction with 
N bidders, culminating with a final take-it-or-leave-it offer.  See Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 195, 
at 187–88.  Analytically, a bilateral negotiation is the same as an English auction but with only one 
bidder.  Id. at 182 n.9.  
198. Quinn, supra note 193, at 880. 
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shareholders.199  This result is consistent with the observation that selling 
shareholders tend to do better than buyers in merger transactions.200 
In the case of both an auction and a bilateral negotiation involving a non-
controlled corporation and a third-party buyer, the price paid to selling 
shareholders in excess of the selling corporation’s current value will always 
represent a transfer of at least some transaction surplus from buyer to seller.201  
In the case of a bilateral negotiation, the amount of surplus captured by the 
seller is indeterminate as this will be a function of parties’ negotiating power.  
Where the deal is fully shopped and there is hard bargaining, then merger price 
can be expected to include more of the buyer’s transaction surplus.  In the case 
of an auction, the more efficient the auction the more likely larger amounts of 
transaction surplus will be transferred to selling shareholders through the 
merger price.  Merger prices that result from a fully played-out auction may 
well represent the highest price reasonably available to shareholders.202  Such 
prices are obviously “fair” to selling shareholders to the extent they are in 
excess of selling shareholders’ reserve price.  However, they also necessarily 
include “elements of value” attributable to the transaction and therefore are 
contrary to statutory limitations put upon fair value calculations by Section 
262(h). 
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court noted, correctly, that a fair price 
“means a price that is one that a reasonable seller, under all of the 
circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a 
seller could reasonably accept” and not necessarily the highest price reasonably 
available.203  To this extent, a successful price negotiation between a buyer and 
 
199. Although a buyer can increase the amount of transaction surplus it retains by submitting a 
low-ball bid to the seller, the effect of a low-ball bid is to reduce the probability that a bidder in an 
auction will succeed.  Milgrom, supra note 194, at 19. 
200. Michael Firth, Takeovers, Shareholder Returns, and the Theory of the Firm, 94 Q. J. ECON. 
235, 235 (1980) (Benefits of mergers accrue to acquired firms’ shareholders and managers while losses 
are suffered by acquiring firms’ shareholders); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes 
Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 21 (2008) (same). 
201. John C. Coates, IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority 
Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV.1251, 1351–52 (1999). 
202. Revlon’s charge to the board in the case of a change of control is to seek out the highest 
price reasonably available.  This, however, is not a requirement under the fair value provision of the 
Delaware Code.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). 
203. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 370–71 (Del. 2017) (quoting 
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 
1995)). 
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a seller is constrained to a range of alternatives that represent the minimum 
acceptable to the seller and the maximum a buyer is willing to pay.204  This 
range of possible prices represents a set of possible points of exchange above 
the seller’s reservation price where the buyer would be willing to exchange 
transaction surplus (e.g., elements of value associated with the transaction) for 
control of the target.  Although it might be appropriate to reference to the 
buyer’s maximum willingness to pay in some valuation circumstances, in light 
of Section 262(h)’s statutory exclusion of elements of value arising from the 
merger, reference to the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay is not 
appropriate.205  When assessing fair value in the context of an appraisal, because 
the buyer’s private value for the seller includes elements of value that derive 
from the management of the seller by the buyer, it is not a permissible inquiry 
for a court when determining the statutory fair value under section 262(h).206  
Consequently, when courts rely on merger price, they are looking through the 
wrong lens. 
Given that merger price reflects the value of the target corporation in the 
hands of the buyer, it is not clear that merger price is at all relevant to the 
determination of fair value of the target corporation exclusive of any elements 
of value in connection with the merger as required under section 262(h).  This 
is especially true in the context of a fully played-out auction where merger price 
reflects the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay, not the fair value of the 
corporation to the seller as a going concern. 
Courts appear to intuitively understand this problem, sometimes 
explicitly.207  Indeed, even the Delaware Supreme Court in DFC acknowledged 
 
204. This is known as the “zone of possible agreement” in the negotiation literature.  James K. 
Sebenius, Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review, 38 MGMT. SCI. 18, 20 (1992). 
205. In Dell, the court makes reference to the buyer’s willingness to pay by saying “in many 
circumstances a property interest is best valued by the amount a buyer will pay for it.”  Dell, Inc. v. 
Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 23 n.108 (Del. 2017) (citing Applebaum v. 
Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 889–90 (Del. 2002)).  Of course, the circumstances cited by the court in 
Applebaum were very different from an appraisal under section 262(h).  Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 889–
90).  Applebaum dealt with a valuation of fractional shares under section 155.  Id. at 889–90.  
Valuations of fractional shares pursuant to section 155 are not subject to the same statutory limitations 
as valuations under section 262(h).  Compare id. at 885–88, with Dell, 177 A.3d at 18–24.  
206. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (“[S]peculative elements of value 
that may arise from the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger are excluded” from the fair 
value determination.). 
207. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004) (observing 
“that acquirers typically share a portion of synergies with sellers in sales transactions and that that 
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that merger prices include “synergies,” resulting in selling shareholders 
receiving some portion of transaction surplus.208  At times, courts attempt to 
deal the problem of transaction surplus present in merger present by subtracting 
synergies or applying a “synergy discount” to the merger price.209  A merger 
price minus synergies approach, while admirable, is more art than science.  By 
anchoring the fair value determinations to merger price, the synergies discount 
approach will still necessarily include some elements of value associated with 
the transaction unless the court is able to precisely value the deal-related 
synergies, which it is unlikely to be able to do in anything more than a 
rudimentary fashion. 
Although endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court as recently as in 
Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,210 the deal price 
minus synergies is a blunt instrument that, because of its impreciseness, 
unnecessarily runs afoul of Section 262(h)’s limits on fair value calculations. 
B. Appraisal as Quasi-Fiduciary Litigation 
Relying on merger price and the pristine deal process standard for indicators 
of fair value may have the unintended consequence of transforming appraisal 
litigation into a new class of “quasi-fiduciary” litigation.  The claims are quasi-
fiduciary because they are synthetic.  In this new quasi-fiduciary litigation, 
plaintiffs will attempt to boot-strap exculpable duty of care violations into 
effectively non-exculpable quasi-fiduciary claims by arguing a failure to carry 
out a pristine deal process should result in a higher valuation for purposes of 
appraisal valuation. 
The idea of re-characterizing appraisal into something akin to fiduciary 
litigation is not new.  In 1995, Professor Mary Siegel argued that in certain 
conflict transactions, appraisal should be available as a device to monitor 
 
portion is value that would be left wholly in the hands of the selling company’s stockholders, as a price 
that the buyer was willing to pay to capture the selling company and the rest of the synergies”). 
208. DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 358.  Nevertheless, the court ruled that absent a reasonable 
justification otherwise, merger price in this case is the best indicator of fair value.  See id. at 370–71 
(citing Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143). 
209. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P., 847 A.2d at 353–54, 357–58 (holding that merger price, less 
expected synergies, was the “best indicator of value” where a merger resulted from a “competitive and 
fair auction, which followed a more-than-adequate sales process and involved the broad dissemination 
of confidential information to a large number of prospective buyers”); see also Highfields Capital, Ltd. 
v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007) (merger price minus synergies). 
210. 210 A.3d 128, 140–41 (Del. 2019). 
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actions of management.211  The professor appears prescient, though perhaps not 
quite in the manner she may have predicted.  Post-DFC appraisal has become a 
vehicle for shareholders in non-conflicted transactions to engage in fishing 
expeditions under the guise of these quasi-fiduciary appraisal claims. 
The court’s reliance on merger price where there is evidence that the deal 
process was pristine opens up appraisal to quasi-fiduciary claims in two ways.  
First, shareholders are able to use appraisal’s discovery tools to feed affiliated 
fiduciary duty claims where discovery turns up evidence of otherwise unknown 
fiduciary breaches.  Second, where discovery fails to turn up evidence of 
breaches, but merely turns up evidence of deal process deficiencies, dissenters 
will be able to use these deficiencies, deficiencies that would otherwise not 
generate fiduciary liabilities, to argue that deal price does not represent fair 
value and thus bias appraisal valuations upwards. 
Quasi-appraisal claims effectively permit shareholders who opt-in the 
ability to engage in a private attorney general review of every transaction, even 
non-conflicted, arm’s length transactions.  From a litigant’s perspective, the 
power of appraisal lies in its ability to provide shareholders who opt-in, 
discovery rights that would not be available in typical fact scenarios involving 
arguably only duty of care claims.  Where discovery turns up evidence of actual 
violations of fiduciary duties by directors, dissenting shareholders can then 
hand off the results of their discovery to plaintiffs to bring post-closing 
fiduciary duty litigation seeking damages.  In this use of the appraisal remedy, 
dissenting shareholders are ultimately indifferent to the standard used by courts 
to value the firm because their object is to engage in discovery in service of 
finding a possible post-closing fiduciary claim.212  From a plaintiff’s 
 
211. Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 79, 79 (1995).  Left unsaid is the rationale for why, in conflicted transactions, traditional 
opt-out fiduciary litigation is not the optimal result.  Others have also suggested this role for appraisal.  
But the idea behind it is not.  See, e.g., Kanda & Levmore, supra note 16, at 433 (lauding appraisal’s 
discovery power).  As Vice Chancellor Laster observed in Trados, “Since Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988), the consolidated breach of fiduciary duty action and 
appraisal proceeding has been a fixture of Delaware law.”  See In re Trados S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 
17, 35 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
212. For an example of this litigation strategy currently in play, see In re Xura, Inc., Stockholder 
Litig., C.A. No. 12698-VCS, 2018 WL 6498677, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018) and Complaint at 1–
2, Obsidian Management LLC v. Tartavull, C.A. No. 2018-0232-JRS (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2018), 2018 
WL 1709657. 
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perspective, gaining access to broad deal-related discovery via an appraisal 
action is an improvement to filing Section 220 books and records actions.213 
Even where quasi-fiduciary claims do not turn up evidence of fiduciary 
shortcomings, they may still be valuable to plaintiffs.  In the absence of 
evidence of violations of the duty of loyalty or a board’s disclosure obligations, 
evidence of deal process deficiencies, such that dissenters can argue the deal 
process is not pristine, will be sufficient to generate potential appraisal liability 
for the surviving corporation.  In that way, where the deal process was less than 
pristine but still well short of a non-exculpable fiduciary claim, the appraisal 
option can transform itself into litigation with a settlement value for plaintiffs.  
Rather than eliminating incentives for arbitrageurs to bring appraisal actions, 
by anchoring appraisal’s statutory fair value remedy to merger price, the court 
may have unwittingly created new incentives for litigants to pursue appraisal.214 
Of course, this result is incongruous given the current state of Revlon 
doctrine as well as the statutory purposes of the appraisal remedy.215  Although 
in the sale of control context, boards are charged with deploying their business 
judgment in a manner reasonably conceived to achieve the highest price 
reasonably available to shareholders, there is no checklist of activities required 
of directors to that end.216  In Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court made it 
clear that there are no specific “acts” that a board must undertake in order to 
meet its obligations under Revlon.217  There is no requirement that directors 
engage in a pre-signing market check, auction, or any other action.  In the words 
 
213. Although a shareholder seeking access to books and records via a Section 220 action faces 
a relatively low bar, it is not insignificant.  In addition, access to books and records in such actions is 
typical fairly narrow in scope.  See Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) 
(requiring the plaintiff present some evidence to suggest a credible basis from which the court can infer 
that mismanagement, waste, or wrongdoing may have occurred). 
214. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1100–02 (2000). 
215. Lyman Johnson, The Reconfiguring of Revlon, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 263 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
216. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994). 
217. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“The trial court decided that 
the Revlon sale process must follow one of three courses, and that the Lyondell directors did not 
discharge that ‘known set of [Revlon] “duties.”’  But, as noted, there are no legally prescribed steps 
that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.  Thus, the directors’ failure to take any specific 
steps during the sale process could not have demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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of the court in Barkan, “[T]here is no single blueprint” for a board to meet its 
obligations under Revlon.218 
To the extent an arm’s length board undertakes a sale implicating Revlon 
that falls short of achieving the highest price reasonably available for 
shareholders, the result of fiduciary litigation will invariably be dismissal in 
favor of the board.219  Absent facts suggesting self-dealing, a board’s failure to 
live up to its Revlon obligations results only in an exculpable violation of the 
duty of care, therefore no damages. 
Although a board may face no liability under Revlon for engaging in a less 
than perfect sales process, the corporation may nevertheless face liability under 
an appraisal action in the form of quasi-fiduciary litigation because it failed to 
structure a sale transaction to comport with the requirements of the pristine deal 
process standard.220  For example, a board that relies on an investment bank for 
valuation advice and then engages in an arm’s length sale to a single bidder will 
likely not face liability in a fiduciary action challenging the merger.  However, 
if that same board failed to engage in an auction or an extensive market check 
or any series of box checking activities prior to agreeing to a sale of the 
 
218. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (citing Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“It is true that a court evaluating the propriety of 
a change of control or a takeover defense must be mindful of ‘the omnipresent specter that a board may 
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.  
Nevertheless, there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties.  A stereotypical 
approach to the sale and acquisition of corporate control is not to be expected in the face of the evolving 
techniques and financing devices employed in today’s corporate environment.’”)).   
219. CLAIRE A. HILL, BRIAN JM QUINN, & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 573 (2d ed. 2019).  And see QVC: 
Although an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reasonableness of the 
substantive merits of a board’s actions, a court should not ignore the complexity 
of the directors’ task in a sale of control.  There are many business and financial 
considerations implicated in investigating and selecting the best value reasonably 
available.  The board of directors is the corporate decisionmaking body best 
equipped to make these judgments.  Accordingly, a court applying enhanced 
judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable 
decision, not a perfect decision.  If a board selected one of several reasonable 
alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though it might 
have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s 
determination.  Thus, courts will not substitute their business judgment for that of 
the directors, but will determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within 
a range of reasonableness. 
637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
220. Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., C.A. No. 11184-VCS, 2018 WL 
3602940, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018). 
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corporation that establishes a pristine deal process, it may face a substantial 
post-closing risk in the form of appraisal.  The effect of the pristine deal process 
and quasi-fiduciary litigation may stretch even further, creating costly 
incentives for boards in mergers that do not involve a sale of control and are 
otherwise only subject to review under the business judgment rule to engage in 
check-the-box approaches to a mergers. 
Reliance on merger price and the pristine deal process standard thus 
threatens to create substantive changes to the legal requirements in the context 
of merger transactions that perhaps were neither contemplated nor desired by 
the Delaware Supreme Court.  Indeed, in Lyondell the court specifically 
disclaimed this approach to a board’s meeting its fiduciary obligations.221  
Nevertheless, directors currently seeking to mitigate the risk of quasi-fiduciary 
litigation in the form of appraisal actions will have incentives to impute onto 
Revlon transactions actions and deal structures that are not required by the law.  
As a consequence of the court’s adoption of merger price, the pristine deal 
process standard, and the resulting anchoring effects, the court may have 
unwittingly created incentives that substantively change board obligations in 
the context of a sale of control. 
C. Inherent Contradiction of Merger Price 
The court’s newfound love of the efficient capital market hypothesis is an 
uncomfortable fit.  Perhaps the single most important question in the corporate 
law is the proper allocation of decision-making authority between the board of 
directors and shareholders (i.e., the market), particularly in the context of a 
merger or sale of control.  The court’s recent decisions to place the efficient 
capital market hypothesis at the center of fair value determinations in appraisal 
actions undermines many of the policy rationales in support of board-centric 
decision making.  One must wonder whether its endorsement of the efficient 
capital market hypothesis is intended to call into question much of the work of 
the courts over past three decades.222  If not, it sits at odds with other aspects of 
the court’s jurisprudence. 
 
221. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 239. 
222. In a host of earlier fiduciary duty cases, courts have regularly declined to agree with plaintiff 
contentions that premium offers should have any influence over board decisions to accept or not accept 
offers.  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he fact of a premium 
alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of an offering price.”); In 
re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434–35 (Del. Ch. 2012) (finding reasonable probability 
of success on the merits of breach of fiduciary duty claim despite nominal 47.8% premium over pre-
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During the 1980’s hostile takeover boom, courts were asked to litigate the 
proper allocation of decision-making authority between boards and 
shareholders in the context of defensive measures adopted to forestall unwanted 
takeover offers.  This question was probably best represented by a vigorous 
academic debate that played out in law reviews during the early 1980s by a 
generation of scholars, chief among them Profs. Frank Easterbrook, Daniel 
Fischel, Ronald Gilson, and Lucien Bebchuk, as well as attorney Martin 
Lipton.223  The professors argued strenuously that in the face of a fully-funded, 
unconditional bid, boards should not be permitted to adopt takeover defenses 
prohibiting shareholders from selling their shares into such an offer.224  
Shareholders should be masters of their own fate and should be permitted to 
accept a market offer for their shares.  On the other side of this debate, Mr. 
Lipton argued that boards, and not shareholders, have the best understanding of 
corporate value.225  The market was not perfect, and shareholders are not likely 
going to be in position to understand the true value of the corporation.  Lipton 
argued that absent defenses, hedge funds and speculators would take advantage 
of short-run dips in stock market prices to take control of firms underpriced by 
the market.226 
In the line of cases that represent the Unocal jurisprudence, the courts 
attempted to walk a fine line between these two views but ultimately came down 
 
announcement market price); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817–19 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (same despite nominal 40% premium); In re Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. 
16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (finding at the summary judgment stage 
that defendants had not demonstrated entire fairness despite 37% premium); Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 
No. Civ.A. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865, at *15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (giving “little weight” to 
the “control premium argument” despite a premium of 96%); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders 
Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 102 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“The fact that the deal with Warburg generated a premium 
over the pre-announcement market price did not mean that the merger was the best value reasonably 
available or that stockholders were not harmed by RBC’s activities.”). 
223. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 
supra note 17, at 1749–50; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 17, at 1161; Gilson, 
supra note 17, at 891; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, supra note 17, at 130–31; 
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1980); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s 
Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 BUS. LAW. 1017, 1026–28 (1981); Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1050–52 
(1982). 
224. Gilson, supra note 17, at 845; Lucien A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing 
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (1982). 
225. Lipton, supra note 17, at 120. 
226. Id. at 104. 
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emphatically on the side of boards rather than markets.227  The themes of these 
Unocal cases are generally the same: In the face of an unwanted takeover offer, 
the board refuses to remove takeover defenses and justifies that decision by 
arguing the offeror and the market do not understand the value of the 
corporation and that the offer and the stock market price undervalue the 
corporation.228  Shareholders in these cases typically argue because the offer in 
question represents a premium over the market price, it cannot possibly 
represent a threat to shareholders, and boards should be required to defer to 
shareholders in that situation.  In upholding the board’s prerogative to adopt 
takeover defenses and its unwillingness to accept premium cash bids, courts 
implicitly endorse the idea that shareholders and markets may have myopic 
views with respect to value and that as between boards and markets, boards are 
in a better position to know what is in the best long-term interests of the 
corporation and stockholders.229  Leaving the locus of decision-making with the 
board in these cases is thus an implicit rejection of the logic of the efficient 
capital market hypothesis. 
By adopting the position that efficient capital market hypothesis is valid in 
the context of evaluating what was fair value in a merger transaction, the court 
makes it difficult to justify arguments for deference to board decisions to adopt 
takeover defenses in the presence of a fully-financed, unconditional premium 
bid, which is the current state of the law.230  If an efficient market has a better 
view on the value of a corporation than the corporation’s board, a board’s 
decision to defy the market can only be interpreted as a disloyal act of 
entrenchment.  Nevertheless, in DFC and then subsequently in Dell, the court 
 
227. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 
A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 
2011). 
228. See, e.g., Air Prods., 16 A.3d at 97–98 (making that argument). 
229. In Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams, the Chancery Court observed that “it is entirely up to 
the board to exercise judgment over what time-frame the corporation’s resources are to be developed 
and how.”  705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
230. This is a position taken by Chancellor Chandler in Air Products.  16 A.3d at 56–57.  This 
position is also consistent with positions taken by then Vice-Chancellor, now Chief Justice, Strine in 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Our law should also hesitate to ascribe 
rube-like qualities to stockholders.  If stockholders are presumed competent to buy stock in the first 
place, why are they not presumed competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate 
time for deliberation has been afforded them?”). 
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accepted the efficient capital market hypothesis as a starting point for judicial 
determinations of fair value in the context of appraisal opinions.231 
Of course, there is a fallacy in the statement that merger price is an example 
of an efficient price for the target company.  It is decidedly not that.  Prior to a 
merger announcement, if one takes the semi-strong ECMH at face value, the 
stock market price of a relatively liquid publicly traded target is a relatively 
good proxy for value prior to any merger.232  According to the hypothesis, a 
company’s stock price will reasonably reflect all the publicly available 
information.233  Although this model is not perfect, there are many examples of 
markets being inefficient with respect to price levels, in general price 
movements move on the margin in a manner that is consistent with the 
proposition that new information is valuable.234 
When a merger is announced, the stock price will typically react and 
increase to somewhere near the merger price.  This reaction to new information, 
the merger announcement, is consistent with tenants of the ECMH.  However, 
at this point, the stock price no longer reflects the long-term value of the 
company.  Rather, it represents a short-term assessment by the market of the 
acquirer’s ability to complete the proposed transaction.  Following the 
announcement of an offer, the intrinsic value of the company at this point is 
irrelevant.  Rather, the stock price, to the extent it reflects anything, reflects the 
risk adjusted present value of the acquirer’s bid for the target.  Factors like the 
likelihood of regulatory hurdles or stockholder resistance to the proposed 
 
231. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 365 (Del. 2017); Dell, Inc. 
v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 24–25 (Del. 2017). 
232. Under weak form, prices simply reflect only historical prices and such prices are not 
necessarily efficient.  Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).  Under semi-strong form, the hypothesis prices efficiently adjust to 
publicly available information (e.g., announcements of annual earnings, stock splits, etc.) such that 
market prices are efficient, but private information can move markets.  Id.  Finally, under the strong 
form version of the efficient market hypothesis, all information, both public and private, is completely 
accounted for in current stock price.  Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Subsequent to the development of the ECMH, behavioral economists called into question 
many basic conclusions of ECMH.  Efficient Market Hypothesis, BEHAVIORALECONOMICS.COM, 
(citing Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053 (G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. Stulz eds., 2003), 
https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/efficient-market-
hypothesis/ [https://perma.cc/NWG4-YQQK] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) (“Findings in behavioral 
finance, by contrast, suggests that asset prices also reflect the trading behavior of individuals who are 
not fully rational, leading to anomalies such as asset bubbles.”). 
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merger may cause the stock price to trade at a discount to the merger price.  The 
possibility that there may be other potential acquirers circling the company 
prepared to make a competing offer may cause the stock price to trade at a 
premium to the merger price.  Note that neither of these have anything to do 
with the target’s intrinsic value, but rather they are market assessments on the 
quality of the offer.  When a court concludes that stock market prices following 
announcement of an offer reflect a valuation of the target company, the court is 
simply incorrect. 
Given that the pristine deal process standard is inconsistent with the court’s 
past approach to reviewing board actions in the context of fiduciary duty 
challenges, what might explain why the court has decided to go this route?  
There are at least two possible explanations.  First, is the instrumental 
explanation: Faced with rapid growth in appraisal petitions and a perceived 
abuse of the appraisal remedy, courts rely on merger price as a way of cutting 
off economic incentives to pursue arbitrage strategies.235  Of course, this has the 
equivalent effect of making the appraisal remedy a nullity for public mergers. 
The second possible explanation for the court’s embrace of the ECMH 
might be traced to the court’s current make up.  It is no secret that in the 
application of the Unocal standard there have been differences in views 
between the Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court.  In general, the 
Chancery Court has been much more open to engaging in substantive review of 
board actions in the context of its application of Unocal, a view generally more 
consistent with the views expressed by Profs. Gilson and Bebchuk.  In Interco, 
then-Chancellor Allen adopted a version of Prof. Gilson’s framework for 
application of the then new Unocal standard.236  This framework was 
specifically rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount 
Communications v. Time.237  Notwithstanding the Delaware high court’s view 
 
235. Jonathan Kalodimos & Clark Lundberg, Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Are Appraisal Rights Being Abused? 1 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894434 
[https://perma.cc/FA5N-JFSP] (evaluating claims of abuse of the appraisal process). 
236. City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797–98 (Del Ch. 1988). 
237. 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989): 
Plaintiffs’ position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of 
review under Unocal principally because it would involve the court in substituting 
its judgment as to what is a “better” deal for that of a corporation’s board of 
directors.  To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain 
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that Unocal should do less, members of the Chancery Court continued to 
express their view that Unocal should mean something more.238  The elevation 
of the Chancellor of the Chancery Court to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
creates an opening for the court to pivot away from the court’s traditional 
application of Unocal towards a more exacting application of the standard.  If 
that is true, the court’s explicit embrace of the ECMH in the context of fair 
value determinations may be an opening move in what could prove to be a 
gradual transition in judicial philosophy.239 
VI. WHAT SHOULD APPRAISAL BE? 
In recent years, courts have responded to the increase in appraisal claims by 
aggressively relying on the lever of fair value to reduce incentives for litigants 
to bring such claims.  The move by the court raises important questions.  First 
and foremost, a standard that requires the trial judge to justify using some 
source of valuation other than merger price is, if nothing else, a light touch 
presumption in favor of merger price for purposes of valuation in appraisal 
claims notwithstanding claims to the contrary.  To the extent merger price 
becomes the presumptive indicator of valuation, such a presumption either 
reduces the statutory remedy to a mere nullity or it creates additional option 
value by promoting the pursuit of appraisal as a quasi-fiduciary litigation.  It 
 
238. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 94 (Del. Ch. 2011); Chesapeake Corp. 
v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 
278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“It is difficult to understand how, as a general matter, an inadequate all cash, 
all shares tender offer, with a back end commitment at the same price in cash, can be considered a 
continuing threat under Unocal.”). 
239. Chief Justice Strine has been an active participant in recent debates with the late Prof. Lynn 
Stout and others about the role of the corporation in society.  His position is nuanced and sophisticated, 
as one would expect of the Chief Justice of the highest court in the State of Delaware, but it starts from 
the view that the law of Delaware is that directors’ fiduciary duties are geared towards maximizing 
stockholder value.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit 
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136 (2012) (“Instead of recognizing that for-
profit corporations will seek profit for their stockholders using all legal means available, we imbue 
these corporations with a personality and assume they are moral beings capable of being ‘better’ in the 
long-run than the lowest common denominator.  We act as if entities in which only capital has a vote 
will somehow be able to deny the stockholders their desires, when a choice has to be made between 
profit for those who control the board’s reelection prospects and positive outcomes for the employees 
and communities who do not.”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763 (2015) (“[T]hat directors do not have to make 
stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance, within the limits of their legal discretion, 
under the law of the most important American jurisdiction—Delaware.”). 
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may be that the current development of fair value jurisprudence provides a 
reasonable opportunity to revisit the usefulness of the appraisal remedy in its 
current form and return appraisal petitions to the litigation backwater that had 
been its hallmark until recent years.  Returning appraisal to its more modest 
beginnings can be done in one of two ways.  First, the legislature can recognize 
the reality of the court’s recent moves and simply broaden the market out 
exception to exclude all public company transactions from the appraisal 
remedy.  Alternatively, the court could remain faithful to the both the ECMH 
and Section 262(h)’s limiting principle by relying on unaffected stock price, 
rather than merger price, for fair value determinations. 
A. Broaden the Market Out Exception 
Given the limited goals of appraisal, it would be appropriate to amend the 
appraisal statute to limit its applicability in two ways.  First, the current “market 
out” should be replaced with the pre-1969 market out exception.  Before the 
1969 amendment, the market out exception eliminated appraisal rights for the 
stock of any publicly traded corporation without regard for the type or nature 
of consideration available in the transaction.240  Eliminating the appraisal 
remedy for publicly traded companies recognizes the consequence of the 
court’s move towards embracing the ECMH and merger price for fair value 
determinations while preserving appraisal for private companies where merger 
prices are not exposed to the oversight of the market. 
Merger price as a starting point for fair value determinations has the effect 
of closing off the appraisal remedy for mergers involving publicly traded 
corporations.  There are good reasons for broadening the market out exception.  
As presently configured, the market out lacks much coherence.  Stockholders 
receiving consideration in the form of cash have access to appraisal rights under 
the market out exception.  On the other hand, stockholders receiving stock in 
the surviving corporation or other publicly traded corporation as consideration 
do not have access to appraisal rights, on the theory that shareholders receiving 
publicly traded stock or stock of the survivor can fend for themselves.  This 
distinction appears almost arbitrary.  Stockholders receiving publicly traded 
stock or stock in the survivor are not able to use the market to fend for 
themselves in the event they believe the consideration received in the 
transaction is unfair.  Assuming the ECMH is correct, following announcement 
of such a transaction, prices respond and the only remedy available to such 
 
240. 57 Del. Laws c. 148, § 22 (1969–70). 
 
QUINN PENA_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:48 PM 
506 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:457 
 
 
shareholders to is to suffer the effects of an underpriced merger by selling the 
shares received as consideration into the market at what may be an unfair 
value.241  At the same time, preserving appraisal for public company 
transactions where consideration received is cash, but then leaning heavily on 
merger price as an indicator of value, seems to leave little more than a fig leaf.  
If providing dissenting shareholders liquidity and deterrence against majority 
opportunism are goals of the appraisal remedy, then the current market out 
exception with its arbitrary distinctions with respect to consideration received 
is misguided.  Rather best “to call a spade, a spade” and eliminate appraisal for 
most publicly traded corporations altogether. 
Second, the focus for the appraisal remedy should remain on private 
corporations and controlled corporations.  Shareholders in private corporations 
will always lack access to a liquid exit in the event of a merger; consequently, 
access to a judicial appraisal remedy is critically important in order to deter 
potential opportunistic behavior.  To the extent the court wishes to be guided 
by the ECMH in the valuation question, such indicators of value are rarely 
available to private companies and the court’s recent jurisprudence in this area 
is not altogether helpful.  Private company merger price provides little or no 
information with respect to the valuation question.  Not only is private company 
stock not traded, this stock is not able to benefit from robust, market-based 
indications of value unaffected by the merger.  And, since the acquirer’s merger 
price is never tested by the market—indeed most private company acquisitions 
are not announced to the public until after the deals are closed, usually with 
little or no pricing information disclosed—there is no reasonable prospect that, 
in the private company context, an unpriced merger will ever result in a topping 
bid. 
The same basic logic is true of controlled corporations, including publicly 
traded controlled corporations.  Controlled corporations will lack reasonably 
efficient markets for their stock since shares trading in such markets will trade 
at a discount.  In broadening the market out exception, legislators would be well 
advised to leave a provision that permits stockholders in controlled corporations 
access to the appraisal remedy without regard to the consideration offered.  The 
 
241. Shareholders, who would not have access to appraisal rights because of the nature of the 
consideration received, would suffer the equivalent harm that shareholders suffer when boards pursue 
value decreasing midstream corporate charter amendments.  The harm they suffered cannot be 
remedied through a sale into the market.  See Lucien Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in 
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1853–
54 (1989). 
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rationale for new a controlled corporation exception to the market out exception 
would be dissimilar from the rationale for appraisal in the context of Section 
253 short form mergers.242  Because minority shareholders are subject to a 
minority discount and opportunistic behavior by the controller, access to the 
appraisal remedy will remain an extremely important tool in ensuring minority 
shareholders in such transactions are treated fairly. 
B. Unaffected Stock Price 
Although the legislature has not shown itself averse to amending the 
appraisal statute over the years, if amendments to the appraisal statute are for 
some reason unavailable, courts can, consistent with the new focus on ECMH 
as well as Section 262(h)’s statutory limitations on fair value, engage in self-
help that ameliorates some of the issues raised by the merger price 
jurisprudence while still meeting the court’s goal of reducing incentives for 
appraisal arbitrageurs to access the remedy. 
First, courts should begin to look to the unaffected stock price rather than 
merger price for indications of fair value.243  The unaffected stock price as a 
starting point for the valuation of publicly traded companies, more than merger 
price, represents a market valuation for the company that meets the goals of 
providing a liquidity backstop for target shareholders while not including any 
element of value arising from the transaction as required by statute.244  As 
always, shareholders remain free to accept merger consideration rather than the 
 
242. By their nature, short form mergers are inherently unfair; consequently it is appropriate that 
shareholders receive access to an appraisal remedy.  See Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 
242, 247 (Del. 2001). 
243. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448–VCL, 2018 
WL 922139, at *24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (finding the unaffected stock price as best indicator of fair 
value where the sales transaction did not show indicia of being robust).  On appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that the trial court’s determination was unsupported by the trial record.  
Notwithstanding the court’s holding in this case, future litigants could still demonstrate at a future 
proceeding in the record that unaffected stock price is the appropriate measure of fair value.  Verition 
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 140–42 (Del. 2019).  In a subsequent 
case, In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., defendants entered into the record evidence of unaffected stock 
price and Vice Chancellor Slights then relied on unaffected market price in determining fair value.  
C.A. No. 12456-VCS, 2019 WL 3244085, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019). 
244. Where the market for a company’s stock is efficient, the stock price reflects the present 
value of streams of future income.  See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 63–65 (6th ed. 2000).  So, in liquid market where information is readily 
available, the unaffected stock price should be the best reflection of the value of the business, excluding 
any speculative elements of value attributable to a proposed merger.  Id. 
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statutory fair value.  Provided it is higher than the unaffected stock price, 
rational shareholders will do so.  This result is consistent with one of the 
purposes of the appraisal remedy.  Appraisal is not intended to replace the 
obligations of a board seeking to fulfill its obligations under Revlon, rather it 
plays an important function in deterring opportunistic behavior by majorities 
and nothing more. 
Rather than rely on a “deal price minus synergies” approach, unaffected 
stock price appears to be an easier and more sensible starting point for most 
valuation exercises that remains aligned with the ECMH.245  The use of 
unaffected stock price of the target as an indicator of fair value also does not 
represent a departure from current or past valuation practices.  It received 
favorable notice in DFC Global Holdings: “[W]here there is a free and active 
market, averaging of market prices on the last trading day before the 
announcement of a merger will reflect the fair market price.”246  Indeed, 
 
245. In Verition Partners Master Fund, V.C. Laster declined to rely on a “deal price minus 
synergies” approach for the following reasons: 
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted by human error.  
Estimating synergies requires exercises of human judgment analogous to those 
involved in crafting a discounted cash flow valuation.  The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s preference for market indications over discounted cash flow valuations 
counsels in favor of preferring market indications over the similarly judgment-
laden exercise of backing out synergies. 
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an 
element of value derived from the merger itself: the value that the acquirer creates 
by reducing agency costs.  A buyer’s willingness to pay a premium over the 
market price of a widely held firm reflects not only the value of anticipated 
synergies but also the value created by reducing agency costs.  The petitioners are 
not entitled to share in either element of value, because both arise from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger.  The synergy deduction 
compensates for the one element of value arising from the merger, but a further 
downward adjustment would be necessary to address the other. 
Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has embraced a traditional 
formulation of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market 
price provides a direct route to the same endpoint, at least for a company that is 
widely traded and lacks a controlling stockholder.  Adjusting down from the deal 
price reaches, indirectly, the result that the market price already provides. 
2018 WL 922139, at *2–4 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  See also Jarden, 2019 
WL 3244085, at *27 (noting “[w]hen the market is efficient, the trading price of a company’s stock 
can be a proxy for fair value”). 
246. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 365 (Del. 2017).  “When, as 
here, the company had no conflicts related to the transaction, a deep base of public shareholders, and 
highly active trading, the price at which its shares trade is informative of fair value, as that value reflects 
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unaffected market price as the best and most reliable indicator of “fair value” is 
a return to the roots of appraisal before the recent attentions given to it by the 
financial industry, so hardly a radical move.247  As a rule, then, a finder of fact 
in an appraisal proceeding should start from the unaffected stock price for fair 
value determinations, rather than merger price.  Where a finder of fact wishes 
to deviate from the unaffected stock market price, then the finder of fact should 
justify that decision. 
C. Challenges of the Controlled Corporation 
Of course, deploying either of the changes recommended above is not 
without their respective challenges.  However, such challenges are likely to be 
limited to threshold questions and well within the competence of courts.  First 
and foremost, private companies will neither have the benefit of merger price 
nor unaffected stock price for purposes of valuation.  For dissident shareholders 
in such corporations, courts will continue to rely on the traditional valuation 
methods of which they are accustomed, including DCF. 
 
the judgments of many stockholders about the company’s future prospects, based on public filings, 
industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts.”  Id. at 373. 
247. Prof. Manning noted that prior to the adoption of the modern corporate law in 1967, 
unaffected market price was usually the default position for courts determining value for shareholders 
seeking an appraisal.  Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 231–32 (1962). 
To the shareholder who objects to a transaction covered by the appraisal statute 
and who pursues his claim with procedural precision, the statute promises 
payment of the “value” of his shares.  In recognition that this standard is hardly 
self-executing in its clarity, some of the statutes refine it a bit by, for example, 
specifying the time at which the stock is to be valued, or making it clear that the 
deciding authority is to exclude changes in “value” attributable to the transaction 
the shareholder finds offensive.  If the shareholder objects to a merger between 
corporations A and B, and his stock in corporation A plummets as a result of the 
announcement of the merger, he is entitled to a valuation that disregards the 
sudden drop. . . . 
 Their way so lighted, the courts have done their best to find, or assign, a 
“value” to dissenters’ stock.  Where the corporation is listed on an exchange or 
where its shares are actively traded over the counter, the problem has proved 
manageable.  The courts have virtually refused to go beyond an inquiry as to the 
market price on the date determined to be relevant. 
Id. (citing In re Marcus, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (App. Div. 1948); Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 
(Spec. Term 1946), aff’d, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 1947); In re Silverman, 122 N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. 
Div. 1953); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Abraham & Co., 166 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Spec. Term 1956); 
Comment, Valuation of Dissenting Minorities’ Shares Under Section 21 of the New York Stock 
Corporation Law, 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 259 (1948)). 
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With respect to public corporations, dissident shareholders will likely 
litigate a number of threshold questions like whether a particular publicly traded 
corporation is a “controlled” corporation and thus eligible for appraisal.  To the 
extent a corporation is controlled, the unaffected stock price is not likely to be 
a faithful indicator of fair value as the stock price incorporates a minority 
discount.  As with private companies, where a court encounters a controlled 
corporation, it should deploy traditional metrics to determine fair value rather 
than merger price or unaffected stock price.  With respect to the threshold 
question of whether a corporation is controlled or not, this question is easily 
managed in the context of appraisal.  To the extent there is a question of the 
controlled nature the corporation, there will likely be ongoing fiduciary duty 
litigation accompanying the transaction.248  In which case, the question will be 
resolved for purposes of any subsequent appraisal action.  In the event there is 
no fiduciary duty litigation, the courts already have well-tested standards for 
determining whether a shareholder is a controller and can readily deploy those 
standards.249 
A second potential threshold challenge will likely focus on market liquidity 
of the corporation’s unaffected stock price—whether the market is sufficiently 
efficient as to reflect an efficient price.  Stock price efficiency is an area that is 
well-trod by securities litigators and is already regularly featured in current 
appraisal litigation.  Where a court determines the pre-merger market for the 
company’s stock was reasonably efficient, then the unaffected stock price is a 
good proxy for valuation.  Absent a reasonably efficient market, courts can, and 
should, rely on more traditional measures of valuation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Recent moves by courts to lean more heavily on the merger price in 
determining fair value are misguided.  While one may be sympathetic to the 
motivations of courts to reduce incentives for professional investors to, in the 
perception of some, abuse the appraisal remedy, doing so in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the statute and in a manner that raises serious questions about 
the sustainability of Delaware’s common law with respect to fiduciary duties is 
misguided.  Indeed, because reliance on merger price is tied to a pristine deal 
process, when the court moves in this direction, it opens up new avenues for 
 
248. Fiduciary duty litigation accompanying freeze-out transactions is common.  See, e.g., Kahn 
v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 639 (Del. 2014). 
249. See, e.g., In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 
1560293, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
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litigation and threatens to impose a backdoor check-the-box corporate 
governance in the sales context, something that the courts have until now been 
loath to do directly.  Rather than do that, appraisal should be reformed to reduce 
its availability in a manner more consistent with its original purpose. 
